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BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

Ex parte NITYANAND SHARMA, SUTAP CHATTERJEE, MANOJ THANKAPPAN, and MAXY SEBASTIAN[1]

Appeal 2019-004747
Application 13/442,915
Technology Center 3600

Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, and LARRY J. HUME, *Administrative Patent Judges*.

NAPPI, *Administrative Patent Judge*.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's rejection of claims 1 through 20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

We AFFIRM.

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[1] We use the word Appellant to refer to "applicant" as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). According to Appellant, Verizon Communications Inc. is the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3.

INVENTION

The invention relates generally to generating an asset processing order. Abstract. Claim 1 is reproduced below.

1. A method comprising:

executing, by a device, a software that includes an interactive user interface configured to generate an asset processing order for assets, wherein the software includes one or more inbound transport profiles that indicate how the assets are to be ingested by an asset processing system, one or more work flow identifiers that identify one or more work flows applied to the assets by the asset processing system, and one or more outbound transport files that indicate how the assets are to be distributed by the asset processing system;

receiving, by the device via the interactive user interface, a user selection of an asset to be processed by the asset processing system;

receiving, by the device via the interactive user interface, a user selection of a type of the asset processing order to be generated, wherein the type of asset processing order includes an ingestion type order, a transformation type order, and a distribution type order;

identifying and prompting a user, by the device, for types of data to be obtained to generate the asset processing order, based on the selected type of asset processing order to be generated, wherein the identifying and the prompting further comprises:

receiving, by the device via the interactive user interface, order data that includes account data of the user of the device for a service provided by the asset processing system;

receiving, by the device via the interactive user interface, a user selection of one of the one or more work flow identifiers;

receiving, by the device via the interactive user interface, asset data that includes an asset identifier that identifies the asset and asset characteristic data that indicates one or more characteristics of the asset; and

receiving, by the device via the interactive user interface, ingest data, transform data, and distribution data,

wherein the ingest data includes one of the one or more inbound transport files that indicates how the asset is to be ingested and where the asset is located,

wherein the transform data includes an edit decision list that specifies transform instructions to be applied to the asset based on timecode data of the asset, and

wherein the distribution data includes one of the one or more outbound transport files that indicates where the asset is to be distributed;

generating, by the device, the asset processing order based on the order data, the asset data, the ingest data, the transform data, the distribution data, and the one of the one or more work flow identifiers;

transmitting, by the device, the asset processing order and the asset to the asset processing system; and

processing, by the asset processing system, the asset in an automated manner according to the asset processing order.

Appeal Br. 22–23 (Claims App.).

EXAMINER'S REJECTION[2]

The Examiner rejected claims 1 through 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2–6.

[2] Throughout this Decision we refer to the Appeal Brief filed January 11, 2019 ("Appeal Br."); Reply Brief filed May 28, 2018 ("Reply Br.") Final Office Action mailed September 24, 2018 ("Final Act."); and the Examiner's Answer mailed April 18, 2018 ("Ans.").

PRINCIPLES OF LAW

A. Section 101

An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a "new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: "[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas" are not patentable. *E.g.*, *Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l*, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).

In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Court's two-part framework, described in *Mayo* and *Alice*. *Id.* at 217–18 (citing *Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.*, 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is "directed to." *See Alice*, 573 U.S. at 219 ("On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, *i.e.,* the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk."); *see also Bilski v. Kappos*, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) ("Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners' application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.").

Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (*Alice*, 573 U.S. at 219–20; *Bilski*, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (*Parker v. Flook*, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (*Gottschalk v. Benson*, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as "molding rubber products" (*Diamond v. Diehr*, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); "tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India

rubber, smelting ores" (*id.* at 182 n.7 (quoting *Corning v. Burden*, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (*Benson*, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing *Cochrane v. Deener*, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).

In *Diehr*, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Court held that "a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula." *Diehr*, 450 U.S. at 187; *see also id.* at 191 ("We view respondents' claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula."). Having said that, the Court also indicated that a claim "seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment." *Id.* (citation omitted) (citing *Benson* and *Flook*); *see, e.g.*, *id*. at 187 ("It is now commonplace that an *application* of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.").

If the claim is "directed to" an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the *Alice* and *Mayo* framework, where "we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an 'inventive concept' sufficient to 'transform' the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application." *Alice*, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). "A claim that recites an abstract idea must include 'additional features' to ensure 'that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].'" *Id.* (alterations in original) (quoting *Mayo*, 566 U.S. at 77). "[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention." *Id.*

B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance

In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) published revised guidance on the application of § 101. *See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance*, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) ("2019 Revised Guidance").[3] "All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance." *Id.* at 51; *see also* October 2019 Update at 1.

Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we first look to whether the claim recites:

> (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) ("Step 2A, Prong One"); and
>
> (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (*see* MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) ("Step 2A, Prong Two").[4]

2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.

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[3] In response to received public comments, the Office issued further guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance. USPTO, *October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility* (the "October 2019 Update") (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf).

[4] This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a practical application. *See* 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. 54–55.

Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim:

> (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not "well-understood, routine, conventional" in the field (*see* MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
>
> (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.

DISCUSSION

Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101

The Examiner determines the claims are not patent eligible because they are directed to a judicial exception without reciting significantly more. Final Act. 2–6. Specifically, the Examiner determines the claims recite several steps of receiving data related to asset management, and generating an order; and that these steps are directed to collecting information and analyzing it, which is similar to concepts found abstract in *Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A.*, 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) and *CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc.*, 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Final Act 3–4 (determining the claims recite a mental process), Answer 5.

Additionally, the Examiner considers the claimed "generating an asset order" to recite a method of organizing human activity as it relates "commercial interactions relating behaviors and business relations, as well as, managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people." Answer 5–6. Further, the Examiner finds that the additional

limitations of the claims recite generic computer components and functions that are well- understood, routine, and conventional, and thus, do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. Final Act. 5–6, (citing para 20 of Appellant's Speciation), Answer 7–8 (citing paras. 27, 70, 72 of Appellant's Specification, *Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp.*, 838 F.3d 1307, 1321(Fed. Cir. 2016), *In re TLI Communications* 823 F3d 607, 610 (Fed Cir 2016), *OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015), *buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc.*, 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014), *DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.*, 773 F.3d 1245, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).

Patent eligibility under § 101 is a question of law that may contain underlying issues of fact. "We review the [Examiner's] ultimate conclusion on patent eligibility de novo." *Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc*., 896 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing *Berkheimer v. HP Inc.*, 881 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); *see also SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n,* 601 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("Whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject matter is an issue of law that we review de novo."). We have reviewed Appellant's arguments in the Appeal Brief, the Examiner's rejections, and the Examiner's response to Appellant's arguments. We concur with the Examiner's findings and conclusions in the Final Rejection and the Answer. Appellant's arguments have not persuaded us of error in the Examiner's rejection of all the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and we address them as they apply to the 2019 Revised Guidance.

The Judicial Exception

Appellant argues the Examiner has overgeneralized the claims as corresponding to an abstract idea of collecting information, analyzing it, and

displaying it. Appeal Br. 13–15. Appellant agues the Examiner ignores the limitations directed to "executing," "the interactive user interface," "generating," "transmitting" and "processing" which are not merely organizing data found by the Examiner. Appeal Br. 13, Reply Br. 1. Further, Appellant argues that the Examiner has misapplied the holding of *Electric Power Group,* and *Cybersource* as the claims recite do not recite analyzing and displaying data, as in *Electric Power Group* or comparing data as in *Cybersource*. Appeal Br. 14–15, Reply Br. 2–3. Appellant argues that the claims recite generating an asset processing order which is different from analyzing or comparing data; as such Appellant asserts the Examiner has failed to establish the claims recite an abstract idea. Appeal Br. 18–19.

We concur with the Examiner that the claims recite a concept of gathering data, and analyzing the data, which is similar to the idea held to be abstract in in *Electric Power Group*. The claims at issue in *Electric Power Group* recited several steps of receiving data from various sources, detecting and analyzing the data, and displaying the data. *Elec. Power Grp.*, 830 F.3d at 1351–52. The court stated "we have treated collecting information, including when limited to particular content (which does not change its character as information), as within the realm of abstract ideas." *Id.* at 1353.

In this case, representative claim 1 recites steps of receiving by a the device, via the interactive user interface, user selection of an asset to be processed and a type of asset processing to be performed (a series of data gathering steps), identifying and prompting a user, for types of data to be obtained to generate the asset process order based on the selected type of asset processing order (a data gathering step (prompting the user) and an analysis step (the prompting being based upon an inputted order type)); the

prompting comprising several more steps of receiving by a the device, via the interactive user interface, various data such as order data including account data, work flow identifiers, asset identifier ingest data, transform data and distribution data (all of which are data gathering steps), generating the asset processing offer based upon the input data (a step of aggregating the collected data). These steps can be performed in the human mind or with pen and paper as they are merely gathering data, and generating a document with the data. They are very similar to the standard process of filling out a questionnaire.

Thus, we do not consider the Examiner to have overgeneralized the claims in determining they recite an abstract concept and we agree with the Examiner that the claims recite an abstract concept (a mental process) similar to that at issue in *Electric Power Group*, and. *See also Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC*, 659 F.3d 1057, 1067 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (claim to collecting and comparing known information determined to be steps that can be practically performed in the human mind); *In re TLI Communications* 823 F3d 607, 613 (Fed Cir 2016) (finding claims the claims to classifying and storing digital images as an abstract as reciting an abstract idea) *Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass'n*, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("The concept of data collection, recognition, and storage is undisputedly well-known. Indeed, humans have always performed these functions."); October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility 7 (discussing *Electric Power Group* and mental processes), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf.

Further, we concur with the Examiner that the limitations "generating" an asset order and "processing" the order recites a method of organizing human activity as it relates commercial interactions relating behaviors and business relations. Representative claim 1 recites the asset processing order is based upon inputted the order data including account data (e.g billing data, see specification para. 13) and transform data specifying the instructions to be applied to the asset and distribution, identifying where the asset is to be distributed. Thus, the "generated" asset processing order is a document that includes information for the billing, actions to be taken (transformation) and distribution, i.e. when construed in light of Appellant's Specification it's an order for sale of media content, transformed (configured for a particular type of device) and delivery a commercial interaction (see specification paras 1-2, 13, 22). Further, the recitation of "processing the asset in an automated manner according to the asset processing order," which does not identify any specific steps performed in the processing of the order, is merely providing the asset ordered (the product sold).

Thus, we consider representative claim 1 to recite elements of two abstract ideas: a mental process and a certain methods of organizing human activity, such as a fundamental economic practice. Merely combining several abstract ideas does not render the combination any less abstract. *RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co.*, 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ("Adding one abstract idea (math) to another abstract idea . . . does not render the claim non-abstract."); *see also FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc.*, 839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (determining the

pending claims were directed to a combination of abstract ideas). Thus, we conclude representative claim 1 recites an abstract idea.

Integration of the Judicial Exception into a Practical Application

Further, Appellant argues that the claims "are directed to an improvement in computer capabilities by providing an interactive user interface of an asset provider device that generates an asset processing order for an asset according to a shared communication layer with the asset processing system." Appeal Br. 16. Reply Br. 5–6. Appellant argues that the claimed user interface:

> [I]mproves the usability and accurate selection of data and instructions for generating an asset processing order, and in turn, improves the use and allocation of network resources of asset processing systems that do not have to support disparate asset processing orders from numerous asset processing devices that operate with disparate frameworks and specifications.

Appeal Br. 17 (citing Specification 1, 2, and 11)

We are not persuaded of error by these arguments. Initially, we note Appellant's arguments are not commensurate with the scope of representative claim 1, which does not recite "asset processing orders from numerous asset processing devices that operate with disparate frameworks and specifications" or a "shared communication layer." Further, the cited paragraphs of Appellant's Specification similarly do not mention processing orders from numerous asset processing devices that operate with disparate frameworks and specification.

As identified by Appellant, representative claim 1 recites a user interface that allows a user generate an asset processing order which as discussed above is an abstract concept, mental process and a fundamental

economic practice. We do not consider the use of a user interface to improve the operation of the machine. Rather, similar to several cases by our reviewing court we consider it to be insufficient to transform the abstract concept to patent eligible subject matter. *See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank*, 792 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015) and *FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc*., 839 F.3d 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("[T]he use of generic computer elements like a microprocessor or user interface do not alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter.") (Citing *DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.*, 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).

Further, representative claim 1's recitation of an interface is unlike the claimed user interface in *Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics Inc*., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In *Core Wireless* the court held that claims which recited an interface were patent eligible as the claims recited specific limitations of the interface such as: an application summary that can be reached through a menu, the data being in a list and being selectable to launch an application, and additional limitations directed to the actual user interface displayed and how it functions. *Core Wireless*, 880 F.3d at 1363. The court found that the claims were directed to an improved user interface and not the abstract concept of an index as the claim "limitations disclose a specific manner of displaying a limited set of information to the user, rather than using conventional user interface methods to display a generic index on a computer." *Id.*; *see also Trading Techs. Int'l Inc. v. CQG, Inc*., 675 F. App'x 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential) (holding that a user interface with a prescribed functionality directly related the interface's structure that is addressed to and

resolves a problem in the art is patent eligible). Furthermore, "merely selecting information, by content or source, for collection, analysis, and display" has been found not to provide significantly more for purposes of finding patent eligibility. *Electric Power Group*, 830 F.3d at 1355.

Here the claim does not recite any specific manner of displaying the data or functionality of the interface, rather the claim just recites receiving a user selection. Further, as discussed above the step of "processing the asset in an automated manner according to the asset processing order" does not identify any specific steps performed in the processing of the order. Thus, the claimed processing recites the asset processing system providing the ordered asset (media). We consider these limitations to be merely reciting use of a computer as a tool to implement a concept of collecting information, analyzing the data to generate an order for an asset and provide the ordered asset, a mental process (an abstract idea) and fundamental economic principle. *See, e.g.*, *RecogniCorp LLC v. Nintendo Co.*, 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ("Unlike *Enfish*, [the claim] does not claim a software method that improves the functioning of a computer . . . [but] claims a 'process that qualifies as an 'abstract idea' for which computers are invoked merely as a tool.'") (Citation omitted). Our reviewing court said the "'mere automation of manual processes using generic computers' . . . 'does not constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology.'" *Trading Techs. Int'l v. IBG LLC*, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting *Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs.*, 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). USPTO examination procedure also requires that "the claim must include more than mere instructions to perform the method on a generic

component or machinery to qualify as an improvement to an existing technology." MPEP § 2106.05(a).

Accordingly, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner's rejection, by Appellant's argument that the claimed use of a user interface to gather data and generate an asset processing order, is an solution to a technical problem and we do not consider representative claim 1 to recite a practical application of the abstract concept.

Significantly More than the Abstract Idea

Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, if a claim: (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not "well-understood, routine, conventional" in the field (*see* MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or, simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.

Appellant argues the Examiner has not presented proof that the claim elements are a combination of well-understood, routine, and conventional elements as is required by *Berkheimer v. HP Inc.*, 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Appeal Br 18–19, Reply Br. 7–8. Specifically, Appellant argues:

> In this regard, while a technological solution may use generic components, these generic components can operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer functionality. *Amdocs Ltd v. Openet Telecom, Inc.*, 841 F.3d 1288, 1300-1301 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Here, the claims require identifying data and instructions to obtain, based on the type of asset processing order of the shared communication layer, and generating the asset processing order that enables the asset processing system to process the asset processing order in an

> automated manner - the processing including the ingestion, the transformation, and the distribution of the asset.

Appeal Br. 19.

Appellant's arguments have not persuaded us the Examiner erred in considering the claims to not recite significantly more than the abstract idea. The Examiner cites to several portions of Appellant's Specification, the MPEP and several cases as evidence of the type required to show the claims do not recite claim specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not "well-understood, routine, conventional" in the field. Answer 7–8. We concur.

As discussed above, representative claim 1 recites limitations directed to gathering data, analyzing the data, generating an order and processing the order which recite an abstract idea. Representative claim 1 recites the additional limitation that the steps of receiving the data are via an interactive user interface, transmitting the asset processing order and processing the asset processing order. As discussed above, our reviewing court has often considered a user interfaces to be a generic computer element. *See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank*, 792 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015) and *FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc*., 839 F.3d 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Further, as identified by the Examiner on pages 7 and 8 of the Answer, the act of transmitting data is considered a generic computer function, *See* MPEP § 2106.05(d) II (iv), *OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc.* at 1093 (sending messages over a network); *buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc*., at 1355, (computer receives and sends information over a network). Further, Appellant's Specification does not identify any particular machine for "processing" the asset according to the asset but rather describes them as "computational devices (e.g., computers)."

Specification 23. Thus, Appellant's Specification does not demonstrate that a specific computer is required to implement the method. Further, in as much at the limitation directed to processing the asset order involves providing the ordered asset (displaying the media) steps of providing displays of data is conventional. *See Electric Power Grp.*, 830 F.3d at 1355.

In summary, Appellant's arguments have not persuaded us of error in the Examiner's determination that representative claim 1 recites an abstract idea, a mental process and organizing human activity as it relates commercial interactions relating behaviors and business relations. Further, Appellant's arguments have not persuaded us that the Examiner erred in finding that the claim is not directed to an improvement in the functioning of the computer or to other technology or other technical field; directed to a particular machine; directed to performing or affecting a transformation of an article to a different state or thing; or directed to using a judicial exception in some meaningful way beyond linking the exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort to monopolize the judicial exception.

For these reasons, we are unpersuaded that the claims recite additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, nor do the claims add a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not "well-understood, routine, conventional." *See* 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of representative claim 1, and claims 2 through 20 grouped with claim 1, under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea, that is not integrated into a practical application, and does not include an inventive concept.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the Examiner's rejection of claims 1 through 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

In summary:

Claim Rejected	35 U.S.C. §	Reference(s)/Basis	Affirmed	Reversed
1–20	101	Eligibility	1–20	

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). *See* 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED