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UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

Ex parte MICHAEL SHEPPARD, JONATHAN SULLIVAN,
MATTHEW B. REID, and ALEJANDRO TERRAZAS

Appeal 2019-003689
Application 14/980,821
Technology Center 3600

BEFORE CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., DAVID M. KOHUT, and
IRVIN E. BRANCH, *Administrative Patent Judges*.

KOHUT, *Administrative Patent Judge*.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant¹ appeals from the Examiner's decision to reject claims 1–20. Appeal Br. 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

We AFFIRM.

¹ We use “Appellant” to reference the applicant as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as “The Nielsen Company (US), LLC.” Appeal Br. 2.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

APPELLANT’S INVENTION

Appellant’s invention relates to “audience measurement entities [that] determine audience engagement levels for media based on registered panel members.” Spec. ¶ 3. The invention “correct[s] for deterioration of a demographic model [that] associate[s] demographic information with media impression information” (*id.* ¶ 2), e.g., with “messages indicating first impressions of a media item delivered to devices” (*id.* ¶ 32). As part of associating demographic information with a media impression, the invention may estimate the age of the respective audience member based on other demographic information (*id.*), e.g., based on the member’s “activity metrics [such as] login frequency, . . . privacy settings, . . . number of contacts” (*id.* ¶ 50). This estimation may include an age correction that compensates for outdated of the demographic model’s presumed age correlations, e.g., because the correlation between ages and login frequencies have changed since the model’s creation. Spec. ¶¶ 44, 54.

Claim 1, reproduced below with added emphases,² is illustrative of the claimed subject matter.

1. A method to correct for deterioration of a demographic model to associate demographic information with media impression information, comprising:
collecting, ***by executing an instruction with a processor*** at an audience measurement entity, messages indicating first impressions of a media item ***delivered to devices via the***

² The Examiner determines the unemphasized portions correspond to judicial-exceptions of patent-eligible subject matter and the emphasized portions correspond to additional elements. *See infra* 9–11 (discussion of Steps 2A(1)–(2)).

Internet, the messages identifying the media item ***presented at the devices***;

accessing, ***by executing an instruction with the processor*** at the audience measurement entity, first demographic information describing first numbers of impressions of the media item and first numbers of audience members attributed to respective demographic groups by a database proprietor, the demographic information being inaccurate based on being submitted by the audience members ***via a website of the database proprietor***, and the first numbers of the impressions and the first numbers of audience members corresponding to the first impressions of the media;

estimating, ***by executing an instruction with the processor***, first ages of the audience members based on the first demographic information, the first ages corresponding to a first time;

estimating, ***by executing an instruction with the processor***, second ages of the audience members corresponding to a second time based on (A) the first demographic information and (B) an aging factor corresponding to the first and second times, the second time being after the first time;

estimating, ***by executing an instruction with the processor***, a third age of an audience member who is not included in the audience members from the database proprietor, the third age corresponding to the second time;

estimating, ***by executing an instruction with the processor***, a corrected age of the audience member corresponding to the second time by:

determining window values by applying a probability density function using the third age of the audience member and the second ages of the audience members;

determining age components by multiplying the window values by respective ones of the first ages;

estimating a fourth age of the audience member corresponding to the first time by dividing (A) a first sum

of age components by (B) a second sum of the window values; []

determining the corrected age of the audience member corresponding to the second time by increasing the fourth age of the audience member by a time difference between the first and second times; and

increasing an accuracy of impression-based ratings information that is based on the inaccurate demographic information ***submitted via the website of the database proprietor by executing an instruction with the processor to*** determine the ratings information for the media by attributing impressions and audience counts to the media using the corrected age of the audience member.

Appeal Br., Claims Appendix A1–2.

REJECTION³

Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to a judicial exception. Final Act. 6–14.

OPINION

For the following reasons, we are unpersuaded of error in the rejection of illustrative claim 1. As no additional meaningful argument is provided for the remaining claims,⁴ we are also unpersuaded of error in the rejection

³ The Examiner has withdrawn the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). Ans. 3.

⁴ Appellant contends independent claims 8 and 15 are patent-eligible for the same reasons as claim 1. Appeal Br. 44–45 (claim 8), 46–47 (claim 15); *see, e.g., id.* at 44 (“As with claim 1, independent claim 8 as a whole is not . . .”). Appellant summarily contends dependent claims 2–7 (base claim 1), 9–14 (base claim 8), and 16–20 (base claim 15) are patent-eligible because each recites more than abstract ideas. Appeal Br. 43 (claims 2–7), 45–46 (claims 9–14), 48 (claims 16–20). As part thereof, Appellant also

of claims 2–20.

Principles of Law

An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”

35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. *E.g.*, *Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l*, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (citation omitted).

In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in *Mayo* and *Alice*. *Alice*, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing *Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.*, 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” *See Alice*, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, *i.e.*, the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); *see also Bilski v. Kappos*, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).

Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent-ineligible,

summarily contends that each of claims 6, 7, 13, 14, and 20 “details operation and interaction with devices.” *Id.* at 43 (claims 6 and 7), 45–46 (claims 13 and 14), 48 (claim 20). As the Examiner finds, none of the above contentions constitutes a meaningful argument, *e.g.*, supports an allegation that a claim feature is insufficiently addressed or incorrectly characterized. *See Ans.* 31–32 (“Applicant’s arguments fail to comply with 37 CFR 1.111 (b) because they amount to a general allegation that the claims define a patentable invention without specifically pointing out how the language of the claims patentably distinguishes them.”).

include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (*Alice*, 573 U.S. at 219–20; *Bilski*, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (*Parker v. Flook*, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (*Gottschalk v. Benson*, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent-eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (*Diamond v. Diehr*, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (*id.* at 182 n.7 (quoting *Corning v. Burden*, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (*Benson*, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing *Cochrane v. Deener*, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).

In *Diehr*, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” *Diehr*, 450 U.S. at 187; *see also id.* at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” *Id.* (citing *Benson* and *Flook*); *see, e.g., id.* at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an *application* of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).

If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the *Alice* and *Mayo* framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive

concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” *Alice*, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” *Id.* (quoting *Mayo*, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” *Id.*

PTO Guidance

The PTO provides guidance for 35 U.S.C. § 101. USPTO’s 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:

- (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, and mental processes); and
- (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (*see* Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. 2018)).

84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then conclude the claim is directed to a judicial exception (*id.* at 54) and look to whether the claim:

- (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (*see* MPEP

§ 2106.05(d)); or

(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.

Id. at 56.

Step 1: Does Claim 1 Fall within a Statutory Category?

There is no dispute that the claimed subject matter falls within a 35 U.S.C. § 101 category of patentable subject matter. *See* Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53–54 (“Step 1”). Final Act. 7.

Step 2A(1):⁵ Does Claim 1 Recite Any Judicial Exceptions

We agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites judicial exceptions. *See* October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update

⁵ The Guidance separates the enumerated issues (1) to (4) (*see supra* 7–8) into Steps 2A(1), 2A(2), and 2B, as follows:

[T]he revised procedure . . . focuses on two aspects [of whether a claim is “directed to” a judicial exception under the first step of the Alice/Mayo test (USPTO Step 2A)]: (1) [w]hether the claim recites a judicial exception; and (2) whether a recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application. [W]hen a claim recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate the exception into a practical application, . . . further analysis pursuant to the second step of the Alice/Mayo test (USPTO Step 2B) . . . is needed . . . in accordance with existing USPTO guidance as modified in April 2018.[footnote omitted]

84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (referencing, via the omitted footnote, “USPTO Memorandum of April 19, 2018, ‘Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (*Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.*)’ (Apr. 19, 2018), available at <https://>

(“Guidance Update”) at 1 (meaning of “describe”), *available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf*; *see also* 84 Fed. Reg. 55942 (Oct. 18, 2019) (notifying the public of the Guidance Update). Specifically, we agree that all of claim 1’s limitations are part of “steps to estimate and adjust demographic information attributed to impressions” and such steps constitute long-standing marketing and sales activities. Ans. 6; *see also id.* at 16. We also agree the claim steps include mathematical concepts. *Id.* at 7 (corresponding specific claim limitations to mathematics). We further agree the claim steps, though performed by a processor, “can be performed in the human mind . . . or by a human using a pen and paper” inasmuch that people mentally perform age assessments (Final Act. 8), mathematic calculations (Ans. 7), and updates of inaccurate information (*id.*). *See also* Ans. 6–7 (corresponding specific claim limitations to mental processes).

We add that the above activities fall within all three groupings of abstract ideas enumerated by the Guidance. *See* 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (categories). The claimed uses of mathematics—e.g., determining window values by applying a probability density function, dividing a sum of values by a sum of the window values to estimate a value, increasing a value by a difference between first and second values—constitute “[m]athematical concepts [including] mathematical relationships, mathematical formulas or equations, mathematical calculations.” *Id.* The claimed uses of audience measurement—e.g., collecting messages that indicate first impressions of a media item, collecting and using demographic information to

www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-berkheimer-20180419.PDF [. . . ‘USPTO Berkheimer Memorandum’].”).

estimate/correct ages of audience members and attribute ages to impressions of a media item—constitutes “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity [including] fundamental economic principles or practices [such as] . . . marketing.” *Id.* The claimed use of a time-correction—e.g., accounting for how ages will correlate differently over time to the same demographics—constitutes “[m]ental processes . . . [including] an observation, evaluation, judgment.” *Id.*

For the foregoing reasons, claim 1 recites judicial exceptions.

*Step 2A(2): Are the Recited Judicial Exceptions
Integrated Into a Practical Application?*

We agree with the Examiner that claim 1’s additional elements do not integrate the recited judicial exceptions (i.e., the above activities) into a practical application. *See* Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53 (describing a “practical application” as a “meaningful limit on the [recited judicial exceptions], such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [exceptions]”); *id.* at 55 (“exemplary considerations . . . indicative [of] a practical application”). Specifically, we agree: “[T]he elements . . . additional to the [judicial exceptions] are the use of a computer . . . to perform some operations (i.e., the collecting and receiving steps), the impressions being ‘delivered . . . via the Internet’, and the accessed demographic information being . . . based on submission via web page.” Final Act. 10 (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted). We also agree “the use of a computer . . . is merely as a tool [to] implement . . . the activity (e.g., gathering/receiving, estimating, performing the mathematics . . .)” and “to merely generally link the [implemented] idea[s] to computers.” Ans. 8. We further agree “the data/information collected and accessed may

be regarding computers and the Internet, [but the claimed] analysis, adjustment, and estimation aspects are . . . [merely] executing instructions on a processor.” *Id.* Consequently, we agree “there are no technical features the claim may be grounded in.” *Id.* at 18 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

We add that “executing an instruction with a processor” (claim 1) to perform all steps requires a processor to perform the following operations: input messages and demographic information to the method; correspond messages to respective ages (e.g., ranges) based on each message’s demographics, publication date, and an aging factor; correct an age of a message sender (audience member) by mathematically calculating window values (via a probability density function) and age values (via multiplying the window values by ages, dividing a first sum of age components by a second sum of window values, and increasing a determined age by a time difference); use the corrected ages of messages to attribute impressions of the media (within messages) and audience counts to the media. This ordered combination only conveys that the operations identified by the Examiner as judicially-expected activities (i.e., the above operations) are merely implemented by a computer—*not how* they are implemented by a computer. The above ordered combination, therefore, does not meaningfully limit the claim features identified as judicially-expected activities. *See Alice*, 573 U.S. at 223 (“[I]f . . . recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to implement [t] an abstract idea on . . . a computer, that addition cannot impart patent eligibility.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); *Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc.*, 841 F.3d 1288,

1311 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[L]imitations . . . recite only insignificant extra-solution activity . . . [if] unrelated to how the solution is achieved.”).

We also add that claim 1 merely limits the invention’s field of use to audience measurement entities by describing the impressions as “impressions of a media item delivered to devices via the Internet,” the messages as including the impressions and “identifying the media item presented at the devices,” and the information as “demographic information being inaccurate based on being submitted by the audience members via a website of the database proprietor.” *See* Spec. ¶¶ 3–4 (describing audience measurement entities and their techniques), 20–31 (describing the problem of audience measurement entities inaccurately attributing demographic data to impressions). “Even though such field-of-use limitations prevent a claim from wholly pre-empting an abstract idea . . . they describe only the context rather than the manner of achieving a result.” *Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc.*, 841 F.3d 1288, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2016); *see also id.* (“The Pythagorean Theorem cannot be made eligible by confining its use to existing surveying techniques . . . nor can the business practice of hedging risk . . . by confining its use to the commodities and energy markets, . . . nor the goal of gathering and combining data by confining its use to particular types of photographic information.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

For the foregoing reasons, claim 1 is directed to the recited judicial exceptions—not to a practical application thereof.

*Step 2B: Does Claim 1 Recite Anything That Is
Beyond the Recited Abstract Ideas and Not a Well-Understood, Routine,
Conventional Activity?*

We agree with the Examiner that claim 1 does not recite any feature that neither constitutes a judicial exception nor is “well-understood, routine, conventional.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Specifically, we agree “the ‘computer-based’ aspect of [claim 1] is merely the implementation [of judicial exceptions] by a computer—i.e., ‘apply it’ via computer.”

Ans. 27. We also agree:

[T]he additional elements (either individually, or as an ordered combination) essentially just implement the idea via a computer[. T]he collecting and accessing is considered receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data[. The] estimating (including the determining steps) is performing repetitive calculations[. The] “increasing accuracy . . . by attributing impressions and audience counts . . . using the corrected age” is storing and retrieving [the corrected age] in memory [and] analogous to [merely] determining an estimated outcome and setting a price[. A]ll [the above are] indicated by MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) as being [well-understood, routine, conventional activity].

Id. at 9 (original ellipses); *see also id.* at 24.

For the foregoing reasons, we find claim 1 combines the recited judicial exceptions with merely appended generic technology.

Appellant’s Arguments

We have reviewed Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 9–42) and, in view of the above analysis, are unpersuaded the Examiner erred. At the outset, we repeat that the Examiner has explained why each claim limitation constitutes either a judicial exception described by the Guidance (*supra* 9) or a conventional activity described by MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) (*supra* 1–

13). The Examiner has also explained why claim 1's ordered combination of activities and technology requires only to execute the judicial exceptions on a nondescript processor that, as any computer does, performs calculations on data input via a webpage and/or accessed via the Internet. *Supra* 10–11. Appellant does not meaningfully rebut these findings. *See In re Piasecki*, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he burden of . . . [r]ebuttal is . . . a showing of facts supporting the opposite conclusion.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). For example, Appellant does not present sufficient evidence or reasoning that indicates a claim feature was wrongly identified as judicially-excepted or conventional activity; or a combination of claim features prevents preemption of the recited judicial exceptions. We address, below, some of the arguments for emphasis.

Appellant contends “[t]he Examiner has not identified an abstract idea but rather identified [caselaw that addresses claims] allegedly similar to [] claim 1.” Appeal Br. 16; *see also id.* at 19–27 (contesting the Examiner’s reliance on *Flook*, *In re Bilski*, *In re Grams*, and *Electric Power Group* to identify judicially-excepted subject matter). As discussed, the Examiner identifies claim limitations as constituting judicial exceptions described by the Guidance. *Supra* 9; *see also* Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 51–52 (explaining that the Guidance, and not case law, is now used to determine whether a claim recites judicially-excepted subject matter). Though having an opportunity to address those findings in light of the Guidance, Appellant declines to do so (e.g., did not file a Reply Brief).

Appellant contends the claimed invention increases the accuracy of ages attributed to media impressions, provides a predicted-age function that

is probabilistically aged, and reduces the need to generate new demographic models. Appeal Br. 28–30. We are unpersuaded because, even if correct, the contentions do not indicate (much less show) the improvements result from claim features that are not judicially-expected. *See SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC*, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[An] advance [that] lies entirely in the realm of abstract ideas . . . is ineligible for patenting.”).

Appellant contends claim 1 describes how a computer estimates an age for a media impression. *Id.* at 31. We are unpersuaded because the contentions do not show a “specific” application for operating a computer. *See Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber*, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (a “computer aided” limitation is not a “specific application” if “silent as to how a computer aids the method, the extent to which a computer aids the method, or the significance of a computer to the performance of the method”). *McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc.*, 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016), which Appellant cites (Appeal Br. 28) but does not address, is highly instructive as to whether a claim recites a “specific” means of operating a computer. *See* 837 F.3d at 1313–16. Describing an abstract idea as a “result,” *McRO* distilled the issue to whether a claimed means of a result is sufficiently specific to prevent preemption of the result. *Id.* at 1314; *see also* Appeal Br. 41–42 (preemption is a driving concern). In holding the claim overcame this concern, *McRO* identified such a claimed means (“first set of rules”) that applied unconventional data (“a keyframe at a point that no phoneme is being pronounced”) to the recited mathematical formula (“morph weight”) and thereby prevented preemption the formula. *Id.* at 1307; *see also*

id. at 1315 (emphasizing that the unconventional appointment of keyframes to phoneme **sub**-sequences prevented preemption of the morph-weighting).
Id. at 1315.

Appellant’s contentions do not indicate (much less show) claim 1’s features prevent preemption of the judicial exceptions (e.g., do not preempt use of the recited mathematic principles to improve an estimation of age). Appellant rather summarizes some case law, identifies (e.g., bolds and underlines) claimed results (e.g., “increasing an accuracy . . .”), and cursorily alleges “[t]he particular arrangement of elements in claim 1 of the instant application results in a technical improvement in the accuracy of database records.” Appeal Br. 32–34.

Appellant contends the Examiner failed to address preemption by “fail[ing] to identify any possibility of improperly tying up alleged abstract ideas similarly presented by claim 1.” Appeal Br. 42. We are unpersuaded because the Examiner identifies the claimed invention’s judicially-expected features and finds, with supporting explanation, the remaining claim limitations add only “field of use” restrictions and an “apply it on a computer” instruction. *See supra* 9–11.

Appellant contends: “[T]he specific features of claim 1 are unconventional. This is clear from the fact that there are no art-based rejections showing how such features are conventional.” Appeal Br. 36. We are unpersuaded because merely overcoming 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 is not a dispositive consideration for 35 U.S.C. § 101. *See Mayo*, 566 U.S. at 90 (“[I]n evaluating the significance of additional steps, the § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry and, say, the § 102 novelty inquiry **might sometimes** overlap.” (emphasis added)); *SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC*,

898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[An] advance [that] lies entirely in the realm of abstract ideas . . . is ineligible for patenting.”). Appellant therefore must, but does not, identify a claim feature that distinguishes over the prior art and lies outside the realm of abstract ideas.

Appellant contends the Examiner has not provided, in view of *Berkheimer v. HP Inc.*, 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018), requisite clear and convincing evidence showing how the claims are well-understood, routine, or conventional. Appeal Br. 34–35. We are unpersuaded because the Answer provides *Berkheimer* evidence. *See supra* 13 (applying MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II)); *Berkheimer* Memorandum § III.A.2 (stating MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) presents a list of “well-understood, routine, conventional” computer functions and is sufficient support for a Step 2B finding).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20.

DECISION SUMMARY

In summary:

Claims Rejected	35 U.S.C. §	Reference(s)/ Basis	Affirmed	Reversed
1–20	§ 101	Eligibility	1–20	

Appeal 2019-003689
Application 14/980,821

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). *See* 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED