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BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

Ex parte ELENA APREUTESEI, MICHAEL R. TENNEYCK,
MICHAEL K. HIGASHI, and GUSTAVO SANTOS

Appeal 2019-001205
Application 13/705,515
Technology Center 2100

Before JAMES R. HUGHES, MICHAEL T. CYGAN, and
JULIET MITCHELL DIRBA *Administrative Patent Judges*.

CYGAN, *Administrative Patent Judge*.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant¹ appeals from the Examiner's decision to reject claims 1–10 and 19–38. Appeal Br. 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

We AFFIRM.

¹ We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC. Appeal Br. 2.

CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER

The claimed invention generally relates to personas in communication exchange environments. Spec. ¶ 1. Appellant defines “persona” as “an aggregation of contact information assembled from multiple contacts, yet presented under a single persona identity.” *Id.* ¶ 16. Personas permit “contact information assembled from different contacts, but associated with the same person, to be displayed in a more organized and efficient manner.” *Id.* Many communication applications provide tools that allow users to search for people in their contacts, initiate communications from their contacts, and manage their contacts. *Id.* ¶ 2. Commonly, these contacts are stored in more than one location. *Id.* A single person may be associated with multiple contacts. *Id.* ¶ 4.

In the claimed invention, a search is requested for relevant personas. *Id.* ¶ 5; Fig. 6; claim 1. A search is then made across different contact sources for relevant contacts, and returns any relevant personas. *Id.* Each relevant persona that is returned in the search results includes contact information assembled from the relevant contacts. *Id.*

Independent claim 1 is illustrative, with the limitations at issue emphasized in italics:

1. An apparatus comprising:
one or more computer readable storage media;
a processing system operatively coupled with the one or more computer readable storage media; and
program instructions stored on the one or more computer readable storage media for facilitating a communication exchange environment that, when executed by the processing system, direct the processing system to at least:

in response to a search request comprising search criteria with which to search for relevant personas and reply criteria with which to populate the relevant personas, identify a plurality of persona identities based on the search criteria;

in response to identifying the plurality of persona identities, identify in a plurality of contact sources a plurality of contacts associated with the plurality of persona identities; and

initiate a reply to the search request comprising a plurality of personas, each of the plurality of personas corresponding to a persona identity of the plurality of persona identities and comprising contact information assembled from at least a portion of the plurality of contacts.

Appeal Br. 11 (Claims App.).

Independent claims 9 and 15 recite a computing apparatus and a method, respectively, which differ in scope with claim 1. *Id.* at 13–14. Claim 15 is representative of claims 9 and 15 and is reproduced below.

15. A method of operating a communication exchange system to facilitate personas in a communication exchange environment, the method comprising:

receiving a plurality of search requests to search for relevant personas initiated by a plurality of application platforms in the communication exchange environment;

in response to each of the plurality of search requests, searching a plurality of different contact sources for any relevant contacts;

and returning a plurality of relevant personas to the plurality of application platforms in the communication exchange environment, each of the plurality of relevant personas comprising contact information assembled from the relevant contacts.

Dependent claims 2–8, 10–14, and 16–20 each incorporate the limitations of their respective independent claims. *Id.* at 11–14.

REFERENCE

Name	Reference	Date
Postoaca	US 2013/0097529 A1	Apr. 18, 2013

REJECTIONS

Claims 1–20 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Postoaca.

Claims 1–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being ineligible subject matter. This rejection was made as a new ground of rejection in the Examiner’s Answer. Ans. 2.

OPINION

A. Anticipation

With respect to claim 1, Appellant contends that Postoaca does not disclose each and every limitation of the claimed invention. Appeal Br. 5. Specifically, Appellant argues that claim 1 requires two steps: first, “search criteria is utilized to find *persona identities*,” and second, “the persona identities are used to identify *contacts*.” *Id.* Appellant argues that Postoaca instead discloses merging contacts for a given persona, and then search criteria are used to find contacts rather than persona identities. *Id.* at 7 (citing Postoaca ¶¶ 12, 14).

The Examiner finds Postoaca to disclose the claimed identifying a plurality of persona identities based upon search criteria, in the form of Postoaca’s searching interface for requesting contacts based on search criteria. Final Act. 4 (citing Postoaca ¶ 14). The Examiner further finds Postoaca to disclose the claimed multiple contact sources associated with

multiple persona identities. *Id.* (citing Postoaca ¶ 60). Specifically, the Examiner finds that Postoaca discloses a persona (“Andrei P.”) that is a combination of contact information from multiple contacts into a single identity. Ans. 4. (citing Postoaca ¶ 60). Further, the Examiner finds Postoaca to disclose searching multiple contact sources for contact information, through Postoaca’s statement that contact information may come from sources including Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn. *Id.* (citing Postoaca ¶ 50).

With respect to claim 1, we are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. The Examiner has shown Postoaca to disclose replying to a search request with personas and associated contact information. However, the Examiner has not shown that Postoaca discloses a first step of identifying personas that are based on search criteria, and then in response to that identifying step, identifying in a plurality of contact sources a plurality of contacts associated with the previously identified personas. The Examiner has not shown any order of providing the personas and contact information, instead characterizing Appellant’s argument for the order of steps as “(1) ‘searching multiple contact sources’ and (2) ‘assembling contact information from the sources for a persona on-the-fly’.” Ans. 3. The Examiner finds Postoaca to disclose those steps. *Id.* at 3–4.

A claim that logically requires an order in which to carry out the recited steps or acts is limited to that order of steps or acts. *See Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Sony Corp.*, 181 F.3d 1313, 1321–1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (finding that factors including the language of the claim limited the claim to the particular sequence of steps claimed), *Mantech Environmental Corp. v. Hudson Environmental Servs, Inc.*, 152 F.3d 1368, 1375–1376 (Fed. Cir.

1998) (finding a particular sequence in the performance of steps to be required by logic, and apparent from the plain meaning of the claim language).

Claim 1 recites, “in response to a search request . . . identify a plurality of persona identities based on the search criteria” and “in response to identifying the plurality of persona identities, identify . . . a plurality of contacts associated with the plurality of persona identities.” Appeal Br. 11 (Claims App.). We agree with Appellants that these limitations logically require an order in which to be carried out. The Examiner has not explained why the “in response to” limitations do not require a particular sequence of performance. Because the Examiner does not accord weight to the ordering created by the “in response to” limitations, and does not explain how Postoaca discloses the claimed sequence of steps, we determine the rejection to be in error. Consequently, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, and the Examiner’s rejections of claims 2–8 based upon the same grounds and reasoning.

Independent claims 9 and 15, and claims 10–14 and 16–20 depending therefrom, have been argued separately from claim 1. Appeal Br. 8–9. Appellant argues claims 9 and 15 together, and argues claims 10, 11, 13, and 18–20 on the same grounds and reasoning. *Id.* Appellant characterizes these claims as including features “generally analogous” to those discussed in their argument against claim 1. *Id.* at 8. However, these claims do not recite the “in response to” limitations of claim 1. We select claim 15 as representative. 37 C.F.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appellant directs their arguments against claim 1 to a lack of the aforementioned two steps occurring in a particular sequence. *See, e.g.*, Appeal Br. 5 (“[f]irst, search criteria is

utilized to find *persona identities*. Next, the persona identities are used to identify *contacts*.”), 7 (“in Postoaca, search criteria is used to find contacts – not persona identities. Consequently, *there is no two-step process taught or disclosed in Postoaca*.”).

However, such a sequence is not recited in claim 15. Representative claim 15 instead requires responding to requests to search for personas by searching for contacts, and returning at least one persona and at least a portion of the contact information that forms the persona. Appeal Br. 15 (Claims App.). The Examiner finds that Postoaca describes these limitations, in the form of a searching interface for finding contacts based on search criteria, in which the contacts are associated with particular personas (e.g., alias information such as “Andrei P.” for a contact), in which contact information may come from multiple sources, and persona and contact information are returned in response to a search request. Final Act. 4–6; Postoaca ¶¶ 14, 60. Appellant characterizes Postoaca similarly with respect to these limitations. Appeal Br. 7 (“in Postoaca, search criteria is used to find contacts,” “Postoaca discusses merging contacts for a given persona ahead of time such that the merged contacts can subsequently be searched,” “a user 102 can decide from which external sources 104 to download electronic contacts 106 before sharing them with other users”).

Appellant has based their arguments on a distinction that the claim requires search criteria utilized to find persona identities, not contacts, and next, the persona identities are used to identify contacts. *Id.* at 5, 7. However, claim 15 recites searching contacts, not searching personas that are then used to identify contacts. *Id.* at 13–14 (Claims App.) Accordingly, Appellant’s arguments are not commensurate with the scope of claim 15.

Consequently, Appellant has not provided arguments persuasive to show error in the Examiner's finding of anticipation. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 9–11, 13–16, and 18–20.

With respect to claims 12 and 17, Appellant further argues that Postoaca does not disclose “a search string that is input while initiating a communication in order to identify a person associated with the communication.” Appeal Br. 9. Appellant argues specifically that Postoaca “merely suggests a searching interface through which a user can interface with a contact management interface application- not that a search string could be entered via the search interface while initiating a communication.” *Id.* (citing Postoaca ¶ 14).

Claim 17 sets forth the additional limitation, “wherein each of the plurality of application platforms in the communication exchange environment includes a communication application and wherein the search criteria comprises a search string input to the communication application when initiating a communication.” Appeal Br. 14 (Claims App.). The Examiner finds Postoaca to disclose this limitation through Postoaca's entering a search string and initiation of a request to identify a person. Ans. 5 (citing Postoaca ¶¶ 14, 60). As noted *supra*, Appellant admits that Postoaca discloses “a searching interface through which a user can interface with a contact management interface application.” *Id.* at 9.

Appellant has not persuaded us of error. Appellant has not explained how Postoaca's initiation of a search request fails to meet the claimed “initiating a communication,” as broadly recited in claim 17. Although the Specification provides an example of entering a search string “during the course of creating an email” (Spec. ¶ 37), such a non-limiting example does

not circumscribe the claim. *In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr.*, 367 F.3d 1359, 1369, 70 USPQ2d 1827, 1834 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("We have cautioned against reading limitations into a claim from the preferred embodiment described in the specification, even if it is the only embodiment described, absent clear disclaimer in the specification.").

The Specification provides a separate example in which the search string is entered and the communication application initiates the search request. Spec. ¶¶ 36, 40. Appellants have not persuaded us that the “wherein the search criteria comprises a search string input to the communication application when initiating a communication” limitation fails to encompass “initiating a communication” where the communication is the search request initiated by the communication application. The Examiner determined that the claimed communication may be a search request, and the Examiner found this to be described by Postoaca’s disclosure of entering a search string and initiation of a request to identify a person. Ans. 5. Accordingly, Appellants have not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s rejection of claims 12 and 17.

B. Subject Matter Eligibility

1. Principles of Law

Patent-eligible subject matter is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101 of the Patent Act, which recites:

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

There is, however, an implicit, longstanding exception to patent-eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” *Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l*, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (citation omitted). This exception precludes patenting of “the basic tools of scientific and technological work” from which all inventions spring. *Id.* at 216–17 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Invention or discovery under § 101 is distinguished as being the application of such tools to an end otherwise satisfying the requirements of the patent statutes. *See Gottschalk v. Benson*, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).

The Supreme Court has established a framework for this eligibility determination. Where a claim is directed towards a law of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract idea, the elements of the claim as a whole must ensure that the claim, in practice, amounts to significantly more than a patent on the law of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract idea itself. *Alice*, 573 U.S. at 217–18. In applying this eligibility analysis, our reviewing court has stated, “the decisional mechanism courts now apply is to examine earlier cases in which a similar or parallel descriptive nature can be seen[,] . . . the classic common law methodology for creating law when a single governing definitional context is not available.” *Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc.*, 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

To address the growing body of precedent, the USPTO recently published revised examination guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (hereinafter 2019 Guidance). The 2019 Guidance seeks to improve the clarity of the subject matter eligibility analysis and improve consistency of this analysis across the USPTO. *Id.*

Under the 2019 Guidance, we first look to whether the claim is directed to a judicial exception because:

(1) the claim recites a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea, the last of which includes certain groupings, identified as mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity and mental processes; and

(2) the claim as a whole fails to recite additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (*see* MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINATION PROCEDURE (hereinafter “MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).

Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:

adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that are not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (*see* MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or instead,

simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.

See 2019 Guidance, *passim*.

2. Analysis

We have reviewed the Examiner’s subject matter eligibility rejection (Ans. 2–3) in light of Appellant’s contentions that the Examiner has erred (Reply Br. 2–3). We are not persuaded by Appellant’s contention of Examiner error in rejecting claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Because Appellant does not argue any claim separately, we select claim 1 as

representative of the grouping, and claims 1–20 stand or fall with claim 1.
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

a) “*Recites an Abstract Idea*”

The Examiner finds claims 1–20 directed to making a request for and receiving data (i.e., the steps of a search request, and identification of identities and contacts) for the purpose of collecting contact information and classifying this information in an organized manner. Ans. 2. The Examiner has found these limitations to be similar to concepts previously identified by the courts as abstract, such as *Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC*, 659 F.3d 1057, 1067 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Ans. 2–3.

Appellant argues that the concepts described by claims 1–20 are not similar to those concepts at issue in the cases identified by the Examiner. Reply Br. 2. Specifically, Appellant contends that the “subject matter in *Classen* [scheduling infant immunizations to reduce the risk of chronic immune-mediated disorders is] unrelated to the instant claims.” *Id.* at 3.

The USPTO’s 2019 Guidance states that the abstract idea exception includes mental processes “when recited as such in a claim limitation(s) (that is when recited on their own or per se).” 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. In particular, Updated Guidance issued by the USPTO in October 2019 characterizes “a claim to collecting and comparing known information” as a mental process, where such can be practically performed in the human mind. October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility 7–8, accessible at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf. The Updated Guidance refers specifically to the same *Classen* case that the Examiner relies upon in determining the claims recite an abstract idea. We agree with the Examiner’s determination that claim 1’s limitations of

receiving search requests for specific data, searching contact data for relevant data, and returning persona data (defined at paragraph 16 of the Specification as contact information assembled from different contacts) and contact data together form the type of concept that can be practically performed in the human mind, or with the assistance of pen and paper. Consequently, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites an abstract idea.

Appellant’s argument is not persuasive. Under the 2019 Guidance, the relevant inquiry is whether the claims recite an abstract idea as described in the three groupings, including mental processes, set forth therein. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51–53. It is not persuasive to show that the subject matter is unrelated (e.g., in field of art) to a specific case identifying a particular mental process.

b) “Directed to an Abstract Idea”

Having determined that claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we next determine, under Step 2A, Prong 2 of the 2019 Guidance, whether the claims are directed to that abstract idea, or whether the claims integrate the abstract idea into a practical application of that abstract idea. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54.

The Examiner finds claims 1–20 to have elements additional to those limitations reciting an abstract idea; namely, computer-readable storage media, a processing system, and program instructions. Ans. 3. The Examiner further determines these to amount to no more than a “generic computer performing generic computer functions.” *Id.*

Appellant disagrees, arguing, “the instant claims pertain to much more than merely making a request for and receiving data.” Reply Br. 3. Appellant further argues, “[t]he claimed solution provides the technical

advantage of being able to retrieve contact information from multiple contacts to be assembled into a persona in response to a search request.” *Id.* Appellant asserts that such would avoid the need for maintenance of a third database for merged contacts as required by *Postoaca*. *Id.* Appellant further argues that the claims “improve the function of a computing system by allowing personas to be populated with contact information from multiple contacts, without having to merge the contact information ahead of time.” *Id.*

An improvement to a technology or technical field may be indicative that an additional element or combination of elements integrates the exception into a practical application. 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. However, an additional element that merely includes instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea, may be indicative that the judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application. *Id.*

Appellant asserts technical advantages from the use of persona identities that are identified based on search criteria and then used to identify contact information, with the persona and contact information returned as a search result. Reply Br. 2 (“[t]he key to how this happens is the *persona identities*”). The Specification identifies “facilitating personas in communication exchange environments” as a goal of the invention; however, such facilitation is not identified to be more than assembling data representing contact information. Spec ¶ 5.

The persona identities are merely data; i.e., contact information assembled from different contacts. Spec. ¶ 16. To the extent that Appellant has implemented an improved method of assembling data into personas for

improved searching, we note an improved abstract idea is still an abstract idea. *See Mayo*, 566 U.S. at 90 (holding that a novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless patent-ineligible). *See also Synopsys*, 839 F.3d at 1151 (“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”) (Emphasis omitted).

Appellant has not argued how the additional limitations; i.e., the computer-readable storage media, processing system, or program instructions, act to improve any specific technology or technical field. Petitioner has merely alleged a “technical advantage,” but has not shown that the particularly claimed manner of assembling data improves a particular technology or technical field. Our reviewing court provides further guidance: “[t]he mere automation of manual processes using generic computers’ . . . ‘does not constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology,’” *Trading Techs. Int’l v. IBG LLC*, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting *Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs.*, 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). USPTO examination procedure also requires that “the claim must include more than mere instructions to perform the method on a generic component or machinery to qualify as an improvement to an existing technology.” MPEP § 2106.05(a). Consequently, we are not persuaded that the additional elements of claim 1 reflect an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to another technology or technical field.

We instead agree with the Examiner’s determination that the additional elements of claim 1 are instructions to implement the particularly claimed technique of assembling data in a particular manner on a generic computer, in effect, using a computer as a tool to perform such data

assembly. Consequently, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner's determination that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.

c) Significantly More Than an Abstract Idea

The Examiner has determined that the additional elements of computer readable storage media, processing system, and program instructions do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea when considered both individually and as a combination, since they amount to no more than a generic computer performing generic computer functions. Appellant argues that the specific three step solution of claim 1 is the "something more" that provides significantly more than claiming a judicial exception. Reply Br. 2. In particular, the "something more" is identified as the "concept of [the] persona identities." *Id.* at 3.

To the extent that Appellant identifies the "concept of persona identities" as providing significantly more than the abstract idea, we are not persuaded. The concept of persona identities; i.e., an assembly of data representing contacts, is part of the abstract idea and not the additional elements. Appellant has not persuasively shown the additional elements of computer readable storage media, processing system, and program instructions to amount to significantly more than the abstract idea when considered either individually or as a combination.

Furthermore, generically claimed elements of computer readable storage media, processing system, and program instructions have been found to be no more than well-understood, routine, and conventional activity in the context of gathering and assembling data. *See, e.g., Berkheimer v. HP Inc.*, 890 F.3d 1369, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ("The conventional limitations of claim 1, combined with limitations of analyzing and comparing data and

reconciling differences between the data . . . amount to no more than performing the abstract idea of parsing and comparing data with conventional computer components); *Ulramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC*, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (updating an activity log by computer is well-understood, routine, conventional activity). As explained by the Supreme Court, the presence of a generic computer performing generic computer functions, such as calculation and transmission of data, is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. *Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank*, 573 U.S. 208, 225–226 (2014). Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument.

In view of the foregoing, under the 2019 Guidance, informed by our governing case law concerning 35 U.S.C. § 101, Appellant has not shown the Examiner erred in concluding claim 1 is directed to a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea, without significantly more, and thus is patent-ineligible under § 101. We therefore sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. Since claims 2–20 stand or fall with claim 1, we therefore sustain the Examiner’s rejection of those claims.

CONCLUSION

For the above-described reasons, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–8 as being anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e), we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 9–20 as being anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e), and we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–20 as lacking subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). *See* 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

DECISION SUMMARY

In summary:

Claims Rejected	35 U.S.C. §	References/Grounds	Affirmed	Reversed
1-20	101	Eligibility	1-20	
1-20	102(e)	Postoaca	9-20	1-8
Overall Outcome			1-20	

AFFIRMED