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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
14/693,861	04/22/2015	Charles Godewyn	1301-061U	2653
112025	7590	03/17/2020	EXAMINER	
Shutts & Bowen LLP Steven M. Greenberg, Esq. 525 Okeechobee Blvd # 1100 West Palm Beach, FL 33401			RODRIGUEZ, DANIEL	
			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
			2175	
			NOTIFICATION DATE	DELIVERY MODE
			03/17/2020	ELECTRONIC

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UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

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BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

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*Ex parte* CHARLES GODEWYN and HENRY ROGERS

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Appeal 2019-000277  
Application 14/693,861  
Technology Center 2100

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Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., DAVID M. KOHUT, and  
IRVIN E. BRANCH, *Administrative Patent Judges*.

PUR CURIAM, *Administrative Patent Judge*.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant<sup>1</sup> appeals from the  
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 2, 4–8, 10–14, and 16–18.<sup>2</sup> *See*  
Appeal Br. 1; Final Act. 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

We AFFIRM.

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<sup>1</sup> We use the word “Appellant” to reference the applicant as defined in  
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as  
“SugarCRM, Inc.” Appeal Br. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Claims 3, 9, and 15 are cancelled. Final Act. 2.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

APPELLANT'S INVENTION

Appellant's invention identifies the Web browser windows and tabs spawned in a browser session, records the arrangement and state of the windows and tabs, and restores (*i.e.*, re-spawns) the same windows and tabs in another browser session. Spec. ¶ 7. Claim 1 is reproduced, below, with emphasis on disputed subject matter (*see infra*).

1. A method for persistently tracking work space arrangement of a customer relationship management (CRM) application through a Web browser, the method comprising:

identifying different Web browser windows and tabs spawned in the Web browser in connection with an end user interacting with a CRM application through the Web browser in an initial Web browser session;

*storing a record of an arrangement of the identified Web browser windows and tabs in connection with the end user in connection with the CRM application;*

subsequently detecting the end user establishing a new Web browser session with the CRM application; and,

automatically spawning the different Web browser windows and tabs stored in the arrangement specified in the record for the end user;

*wherein the record further includes a list of identified work paths, each of the work paths referring to a node in a site map of the CRM application and comprising a window and one or more tabs opened in the window, and wherein different ones of the Web browser windows and corresponding tabs specified in the record for the end user are automatically spawned as specified by one of the work paths selected by the end user in the list.*

Appeal Br. 15 (Claims Appendix).

REJECTION

Claims 1, 2, 4–8, 10–14, and 16–18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Song (US 2005/0066037 A1; Mar. 24, 2005), Dubroy (US 2015/0200829 A1; July 16, 2015), Godley (US 2006/0101330 A1; May 11, 2006), and Ferg (US 9,483,627 B1; Nov. 1, 2016).

OPINION

Claims 1, 2, 4–8, 10–14, and 16–18 are argued as a group. *See* Appeal Br. 6–14 (the *in-toto* arguments address, under the same heading and with specific reference to claim 1, only the independent claims). We select claim 1 as representative. *See* 37 C.F.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iv). For the reasons below, we are unpersuaded of error in the rejection of claim 1 and accordingly sustain the rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–8, 10–14, and 16–18.

The disputed limitations recite a record comprising work paths, each work path: referencing a site map node that represents a browser window and included tab, as arranged by a CRM application’s user; and selectable by the user to automatically spawn the same arrangement of the window and tab. Appeal Br. 7. We agree with the Examiner that the proposed combination of prior art suggests these claim features.

As the Examiner finds, Song teaches snapshots that capture any changes to a browser session and are selected to restore respective changes (*i.e.*, each restores the captured state) in another session. Final Act. 4–5; Ans. 5–6; Song ¶¶ 43, 78, 80. Dubroy teaches that a snapshot for capturing a browser window can capture the included tabs. Final Act. 5; Ans. 6–7; Dubroy ¶ 33. Godley teaches that a browser session history can be a sitemap representation of thumbnails that are selected to restore respective

web pages, spread sheets, word processing documents, presentations, and so forth. Final Act. 6; Ans. 7–8; Godley ¶¶ 21–26, 32. Ferg teaches that a CRM application can be a web application accessed via a browser.

Final Act. 7; Ans. 8; Ferg col. 4, ll. 14–28.

The Examiner finds that these teachings collectively suggest a system that: provides browser-session access to a CRM application (Ferg); snapshots a session's open window with sufficient detail to fully restore (i.e., fully recall and load) the window in another session (Song), *e.g.*, to restore included tabs (Dubroy); restores a window if/when selected by the user (Song); and provides a sitemap representation of the restorable windows, each window being represented and selected via a thumbnail (Godley). Final Act. 3–7 (Examiner applied teachings of the references); Ans. 5–8 (Examiner further-explained reliance on the references). The proposed combination of prior art, therefore, provides a record of work paths (stored snapshots) whereby each path (snapshot) references a site map node (each snapshot is selected via a sitemap representation of a respective thumbnail) and is selected to spawn a browser window and included tab/s (each snapshot is selected to restore a respective window and tab/s). *See e.g.*, Final Act. 4–5 (Examiner finds claimed work paths respectively read on snapshotted sessions (Song)), 5 (discloses snapshotting a session's window and tabs (Dubroy)), 6 (claimed site map node reads on a selectable stored session (Godley)); Ans. 4–6 (claimed record reads on all stored sessions).

Appellant contends the rejection fails to read the claimed record, work paths, windows, and tabs respectively on different elements of the applied prior art and thereby fails to construe these claim terms/features as being different from one another (i.e., as having respective meanings).

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Appeal Br. 9–10, 13–14; *see also* *Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc.*, 880 F.3d 1356, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (presumption that different claim terms have different meanings (citing *Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc. v. Int’l Sec. Exch., LLC*, 677 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012))). We are unpersuaded of Examiner error because, per the combination, the rejection reads: the claimed record on the combination’s stored snapshots; each claimed work path on a snapshot; and each claimed window and its tabs on a snapshot’s respective window and tabs. *See* Final Act. 4–5 (proposed combination).

Appellant also contends that Song, Dubroy, and Godley *individually* fail to teach or suggest several claim limitations. Appeal Br. 9–14; *see e.g.*, *id.* at 10 (“[T]he actual snapshot display of Song is a single tab of a webpage, not a record of arrangement of those tabs and webpages.”). We are unpersuaded because each of the argued limitations is read on a **combination** of teachings from two or more of the applied references. *See* Final Act. 4–5 (proposed combination). Where a rejection reads a claim feature on combined teachings of two or more references, it is not persuasive to show one reference individually fails to teach the feature. *See e.g.*, *In re Keller*, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (C.C.P.A. 1981). We are, therefore, unpersuaded as Appellant has failed to address the Examiner’s specific findings regarding the combination of the references.

## CONCLUSION

We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 2, 4–8, 10–14, and 16–18.

DECISION SUMMARY

In summary:

<b>Claims Rejected</b>	<b>35 U.S.C. §</b>	<b>Reference(s)/ Basis</b>	<b>Affirmed</b>	<b>Reversed</b>
1, 2, 4–8, 10–14, 16–18	103	Song, Dubroy, Godley, Ferg	1, 2, 4–8, 10–14, 16–18	

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). *See* 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED