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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
13/959,458	08/05/2013	Curt Stewart	SF-16091.105036	6722
164349	7590	02/27/2020	EXAMINER	
Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP - State Farm 300 N. Meridian Street Suite 2500 Indianapolis, IN 46204			SUBRAMANIAN, NARAYANSWAMY	
			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
			3695	
			NOTIFICATION DATE	DELIVERY MODE
			02/27/2020	ELECTRONIC

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UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

Ex parte CURT STEWART, MATTHEW T. FRANK, NEALE
McCORMICK, MATT BAUGHMAN, and RAMAKRISHNA DUVVURI

Appeal 2018-008049
Application 13/959,458¹
Technology Center 3600

Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, and
AMEE A. SHAH, *Administrative Patent Judges*.

FISCHETTI, *Administrative Patent Judge*.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 14–20, 22, and 24–26. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

SUMMARY OF DECISION

We affirm.

¹ We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. Appeal Br. 2.

THE INVENTION

Appellant states “[t]he present disclosure relates generally to systems and methods for rating an insurance product.” Spec. ¶ 2.

Claim 14, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on appeal.

14. A method for storing and accessing a plurality of collected data to provide an insurance rate using a programmed computer system including a processor and a non-transitory, tangible computer readable medium communicatively coupled to the processor and storing instructions executable by the processor to perform the method comprising:

storing, in a database, (a) an array of grid-based geographic areas, and (b) data received from multiple data sources, including aligned Raster data and applied tabular data representing particular insurance data related to one or more non-grid-based geographic areas;

comparing the received data against existing data in the database to identify relevant data against a particular insurance coverage;

transforming the stored and relevant data into developed geographic data associated with a specific truncated grid identifier key;

the processor generating a displayed image of the array of grid-based geographic areas and a displayed image of the one or more non-grid-based geographic areas;

the processor identifying shared pixels between the displayed image of the array of grid-based geographic areas and the displayed image of the one or more non-grid-based geographic areas;

the processor calculating a quantity of the particular data corresponding to individual grid-based geographic areas based at least on the quantity of identified shared pixels for each grid-based geographic area;

the processor receiving an insurance rate query indicating a particular geographic location by, at least in part, indicating a coordinate pair comprising a latitude and longitude of the location;

the processor selecting a subset of the grid-based geographic areas related to the particular geographic location by comparing the coordinate pair to a lookup table of truncated decimal representations of longitude and latitude and wherein the subset includes at least a primary grid-based geographic area based on a selected truncated decimal representation;

the processor determining a quantity of stored data associated with the subset of grid-based geographic areas, including the calculated quantity of the particular data corresponding to each of the subset of grid-based geographic areas;

the processor calculating a predictiveness value based on the calculated quantity of the stored data associated with the subset of grid-based geographic areas;

the processor determining that the predictiveness value is below a target credibility threshold;

in response to determining that the predictiveness value is below the target credibility threshold, the processor iteratively increasing the subset of grid-based geographic areas by adding at least one additional grid-based geographic area adjacent the primary grid-based geographic area and determining a quantity of stored data associated with the increased subset of grid-based geographic areas, until a credibility factor determined for the increased subset of grid-based geographic areas meets or exceeds the target credibility threshold; and

upon the predictiveness value meeting or exceeding the target credibility threshold, the processor calculating an insurance rate based at least on the on the stored data associated with the increased subset of grid-based geographic areas; and

the processor communicating the calculated insurance rate to a user.

THE REJECTION

Claims 14–20, 22, and 24–26 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter.

FINDINGS OF FACT

We adopt the Examiner’s findings as set forth on pages 2–11 in the Final Office Action² and on pages 3–8 in the Examiner’s Answer.

ANALYSIS

35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION

We will affirm the rejection of the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

The Appellant argues claims 14–20, 22, and 24–26 as a group. (Appeal Br. 8). We select claim 14 as the representative claim for this group, and so the remaining claims stand or fall with claim 14. *See* 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2015).

An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[I]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. *E.g.*, *Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l*, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).

In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in *Mayo* and *Alice*. *Alice*, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing *Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.*, 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” *See id.* at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, *i.e.*, the use of a third party to mitigate

² All references to the Final Office Action refer to the Final Office Action mailed on January 12, 2018.

settlement risk.”); *see also Bilski v. Kappos*, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).

Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (*Alice*, 573 U.S. at 219–20; *Bilski*, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (*Parker v. Flook*, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (*Gottschalk v. Benson*, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (*Diamond v. Diehr*, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (*id.* at 182 n.7 (quoting *Corning v. Burden*, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (*Benson*, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing *Cochrane v. Deener*, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).

In *Diehr*, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” *Diehr*, 450 U.S. at 187; *see also id.* at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” *Id.* (citing *Benson* and *Flook*); *see, e.g., id.* at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an *application* of a law of nature or mathematical formula

to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).

If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the *Alice* and *Mayo* framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” *Alice*, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” *Id.* (alterations in original) (quoting *Mayo*, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” *Id.*

In January, 2019, the PTO published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:

- (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and
- (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (*see* Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).

Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:

- (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (*see* MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or

(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.

See Guidance.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the [S]pecification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” *Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.*, 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting *Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc.*, 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. *See Enfish*, 822 F.3d at 1335–36.

In so doing, as indicated above, we apply a “directed to” two prong test: 1) evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial exception, and 2) if the claim recites a judicial exception, evaluate whether the claim “appl[ies], rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53; *see also* MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).

The Specification states:

A typical family seeking automobile insurance cannot, however, produce anywhere near the amount of data needed to make a reliable and accurate estimate of anticipated claims for their vehicle or vehicles. Thus, insurance companies must rate personal policies in a risk pool of comparable policies to produce enough data to make such an estimate. One mechanism for doing this is to assess what data is available for the family (e.g., demographic information, types of vehicles,

and what limited claim information is available) and use that data to assign an appropriate pool to the family.

Specification ¶ 5.

The preamble states it is for, “accessing a plurality of collected data to provide an insurance rate.”

Claim 14 recites in pertinent part the abstractions of:

storing, . . . (a) an array of grid-based geographic areas, and (b) data received from multiple data sources, . . . including applied tabular data representing particular insurance data related to one or more non-grid-based geographic areas; comparing the received data against existing data in the database to identify relevant data against a particular insurance coverage; transforming the stored and relevant data into developed geographic data associated with a specific truncated grid identifier key; . . . generating a displayed image of the array of grid-based geographic areas and a displayed image of the one or more non-grid-based geographic areas; . . . identifying shared pixels between the displayed image of the array of grid-based geographic areas and the displayed image of the one or more non-grid-based geographic areas; . . . calculating a quantity of the particular data corresponding to individual grid-based geographic areas based at least on the quantity of identified shared pixels for each grid-based geographic area; . . . receiving an insurance rate query indicating a particular geographic location by, at least in part, indicating a coordinate pair comprising a latitude and longitude of the location; . . . selecting a subset of the grid-based geographic areas related to the particular geographic location by comparing the coordinate pair to a lookup table of truncated decimal representations of longitude and latitude and wherein the subset includes at least a primary grid-based geographic area based on a selected truncated decimal representation; . . . determining a quantity of stored data associated with the subset of grid-based geographic areas, including the calculated quantity of the particular data corresponding to each of the

subset of grid-based geographic areas; . . . calculating a predictiveness value based on the calculated quantity of the stored data associated with the subset of grid-based geographic areas; . . . determining that the predictiveness value is below a target credibility threshold; in response to determining that the predictiveness value is below the target credibility threshold, . . . iteratively increasing the subset of grid-based geographic areas by adding at least one additional grid-based geographic area adjacent the primary grid-based geographic area and determining a quantity of stored data associated with the increased subset of grid-based geographic areas, until a credibility factor determined for the increased subset of grid-based geographic areas meets or exceeds the target credibility threshold; and upon the predictiveness value meeting or exceeding the target credibility threshold, . . . calculating an insurance rate based at least on the on the stored data associated with the increased subset of grid-based geographic areas; and . . . communicating the calculated insurance rate to a user.

The Examiner found claim 14 is “directed to providing an insurance rate based on a plurality of collected data which is considered to be an abstract idea similar to the concepts that have been identified by the courts such as managing an insurance policy ([See] *Bancorp Services v. Sunlife*) and creating a contractual relationship ([See] *buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc.*).” (Final Act. 2).

We similarly find that claim 14 recites a method of determining an insurance rating based on a plurality of collected data. This is apparent from the plain language of the claim which recites in pertinent part, “provide an insurance rate,” “identify relevant data against a particular insurance coverage,” “receiv[e] an insurance rate query,” and “calculat[e] an insurance rate.” Determining an insurance rating is a fundamental economic principle or practice because it keeps the insurer solvent. A fundamental economic

principle is an enumerated certain method of organizing human behavior and hence a judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, citing *Bilski*, 561 U.S. 593, 611.

We also find that claim 14 recites a mental process and/or a mathematical concept for calculating an insurance rate query for a particular geographic location. Limitations such as, “calculating a predictiveness value based on the calculated quantity of the stored data associated with the subset of grid-based geographic areas;” “determining that the predictiveness value is below a target credibility threshold;” “determining that the predictiveness value is below the target credibility threshold, ...iteratively increasing the subset of grid-based geographic areas by adding at least one additional grid-based geographic area adjacent the primary grid-based geographic area,” are mental process steps and/or mathematical concepts which are enumerated judicial exceptions and thus abstract ideas. *See* Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, citing *Bilski v. Kappos*, 561 U.S. 593, 611, *Mayo*, 566 U.S. at 71. Thus, all this intrinsic evidence shows that claim 14 is also directed to mental process steps and/or mathematical concepts. This also is consistent with the Examiner’s determination.

Turning to the second prong of the “directed to” test, claim 14 only generically requires “a database,” and “a processor.” These components are described in the Specification at a high level of generality. *See* Spec. ¶¶ 132–139, Fig. 11. We fail to see how the generic recitations of these most basic computer components and/or of a system so integrates the judicial exception as to “impose[] a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53.

Thus, we find that the claims recite the judicial exceptions of a fundamental economic principle and mental process/mathematical concepts.

That the claims do not preempt all forms of the abstraction or may be limited to insurance ratings, does not make them any less abstract. *See OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“And that the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less abstract.”).

Turning to the second step of the *Alice* analysis, because we find that the claim 14 is directed to abstract ideas/judicial exceptions, the claim must include an “inventive concept” in order to be patent-eligible, i.e., there must be an element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claim in practice amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. *See Alice*, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting *Mayo Collaborative Servs.*, 566 U.S. at 72–73).

Concerning this step the Examiner found the following:

The elements of the instant process, when taken alone, each execute in a manner routinely and conventionally expected of these elements. For instance the functions such as “storing data, comparing the received data against existing data, transforming data based on criteria, generating images, identifying information, calculating based on transformed data and identified information, receiving a query, selecting, determining, calculating a predictiveness value, determining, iteratively determining comparing the predictiveness value with a threshold, calculating a rate, and communicating the rate” are conventional functions of a computer. The elements of the instant process, when taken in combination, together do not offer substantially more than the sum of the functions of the elements when each is taken alone. That is, the elements

involved in the recited process undertake their roles in performance of their activities according to their generic functionalities which are well-understood, routine and conventional. The elements together execute in routinely and conventionally accepted coordinated manners and interact with their partner elements to achieve an overall outcome which, similarly, is merely the combined and coordinated execution of generic computer functionalities which are well-understood, routine and conventional activities previously known to the industry. Similar reasoning and rationale applies to the system claim 25 and computer product claim 26 also.

(Final Act. 8). We agree with the Examiner. “[T]he relevant question is whether the claim[] here do[es] more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea . . . on a generic computer.” *Alice*, 573 U.S. at 225. It does not.

Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a computer to store, compare, transform, calculate, determine, communicate and apply decision criteria to data amounts to electronic data query and retrieval—one of the most basic functions of a computer. All of these computer functions are well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry. *See Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A.*, 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016); *see also In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig.*, 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer without special programming”). In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions. The claim does not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. In addition, as we stated above, the

claim does not effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. The Specification spells out different generic equipment and parameters that might be applied using this concept and the particular steps such conventional processing would entail based on the concept of information access under different scenarios (*see, e.g., See Spec.* ¶¶ 132–139, Fig. 11). Thus, claim 14 amounts to nothing significantly more than instructions to apply the abstract idea using some unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. *See Alice*, 573 U.S. at 225–226.

Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of Appellant’s claim 14 adds nothing that is not already present when the steps are considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis (compare, transform, calculate, determine, communicate and apply decision criteria to data) and storing is equally generic and conventional or has otherwise held to be abstract. *See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC*, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction), *Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc.*, 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display, and transmission was abstract), *Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC*, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring was abstract). The ordering of the steps is, therefore, ordinary and conventional.

We have reviewed all the arguments Appellant has submitted concerning the patent eligibility of the claims before us that stand rejected

under 35 U.S.C. § 101. (Appeal Br. 8–14, Reply Brief 2–9). We find that our analysis above substantially covers the substance of all the arguments, which have been made. But, for purposes of completeness, we will address various arguments in order to make individual rebuttals of same.

Appellant argues:

The allowed claims of the parent patent, U.S. Patent No. 8,504,393, are similar to the claims of the present application. . . . The claims of the present application are directed to statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, similar to all of the claims in the issued patents of the patent family. Thus, the rejection under 35 U.S.C. §101 should be withdrawn.

(Appeal Br. 8–10).

We disagree with Appellant because the issue date of U.S. Patent No. 8,504,393 was August 6, 2013, and since that date, the jurisprudence on patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 has changed. *See e.g., Alice Corp.* 573 U.S. 208, 219–220.

Citing to *Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L., v. LG Electronics, Inc.*, 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018), Appellant argues that its claims are similar to those in *Coreless Wireless* because “claims to computing devices were held patent eligible because the court concluded that they are directed to an improved user interface for electronic devices, not to the abstract idea of an index.” (Appeal Br. 11).

We disagree with Appellant. In *Core Wireless*, the claims were directed to improved functionality in a user interface, an unconventional device improvement. *Core Wireless*, 880 F.3d at 1362. Specifically:

Claim 1 of the ‘476 patent *requires* “*an application summary that can be reached directly from the menu,*” *specifying a particular manner by which the summary window must be*

accessed. The claim further requires the application summary window list a limited set of data, “each of the data in the list being selectable to launch the respective application and enable the selected data to be seen within the respective application.” This claim limitation restrains the type of data that can be displayed in the summary window. Finally, the claim recites *that the summary window “is displayed while the one or more applications are in an un-launched state,” a requirement that the device applications exist in a particular state.* These limitations disclose a specific manner of displaying a limited set of information to the user, rather than using conventional user interface methods to display a generic index on a computer.

Id. at 1362–63 (emphasis added). The words shown in italics above emphasize specific technical features which the court found were technological improvements over the existing technology environment. Even accepting that the claims before us on appeal here result in “a specific manner of displaying a limited set of information to a user (*id.*),” that still would not demonstrate a technical improvement because and “the claim language here [(claim 14)] provides only a result-oriented solution, with insufficient detail for how a computer accomplishes it.” *Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp.*, 850 F.3d 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2017), *see also Move, Inc. v. Real Estate Alliance Ltd.*, 721 Fed. App’x 950, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Nonprecedential) (“Claim 1 is aspirational in nature and devoid of any implementation details or technical description that would permit us to conclude that the claim as a whole is directed to something other than the abstract idea identified by the district court.”).

Nor do we agree that *Trading Tech. Int’l., Inc. v. CQG, Inc.*, 675 F. App’x. 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2017) is helpful to Appellant’s position. (Appeal Br. 12–13). In *Trading Technologies*, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the patented claims (which recited a method and

system for displaying market information on a graphical user interface) were not directed to an abstract idea because the district court found, and the Federal Circuit agreed, that the challenged patents did not simply claim displaying information on a graphical user interface; instead, the claims required “a specific, structured graphical user interface paired with a prescribed functionality directly related to the graphical user interface’s structure that is addressed to and resolves a specifically identified problem in the prior state of the art.” *Trading Technologies*, 675 F. App’x at 1004. The Federal Circuit, thus, found that the district court’s ruling was in accord with precedent that has recognized that “specific technologic modifications to solve a problem or improve the functioning of a known system generally produce patent-eligible subject matter.” *Id.* at 1004–05.

In contrast, the claims before us on appeal here do not involve any such specific technological improvements, let alone ones to a GUI. We find no indication in the Specification, nor does Appellant direct us to any indication, that the operations recited in independent claim 14 invoke any assertedly inventive programming, require any specialized computer hardware or other inventive computer components, i.e., a particular machine, or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer components to perform generic computer functions. *See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.*, 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]fter *Alice*, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”). Claim 14 does not improve another technology, because, e.g., using a processor to calculate a predictiveness value based on the calculated quantity of the stored data associated with the subset of grid-based geographic areas,

is a conventional use of a computer. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 55; *see also* MPEP § 2106.05(a). Because no more than a generic computer is required, the claim also does not define, or rely on, a “particular machine.” MPEP § 2106.05(b).

Appellant’s other arguments, including those directed to now-superseded USPTO guidance, have been considered, but are not persuasive of error. (*See* 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“Eligibility-related guidance issued prior to the Ninth Edition, R–08.2017, of the MPEP (published Jan. 2018) should not be relied upon.”)).

For the reasons identified above, we determine there are no deficiencies in the Examiner’s rejection of patent ineligibility of the rejected claims. Therefore, we will sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of claims 14–20, 22, and 24–26.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 14–20, 22, and 24–26 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

DECISION

In summary:

Claims Rejected	35 U.S.C. §	Reference(s)/Basis	Affirmed	Reversed
14–20, 22, 24–26	101	Eligibility	14–20, 22, 24–26	

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). *See* 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED