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UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

Ex parte DOUGLAS MUELLER

Appeal 2018-007911
Application 13/006,127
Technology Center 3600

Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, DENISE M. POTHIER, and
JUSTIN BUSCH, *Administrative Patent Judges*.

BUSCH, *Administrative Patent Judge*.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant¹ appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–7, 10, 11, 14–16, 20–24, and 26–31, which constitute all the claims pending in this Application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). Claims 8, 9, 12, 13, 17–19, and 25 were cancelled.

We reverse.

¹ We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as BMC Software, Inc. Appeal Br. 1.

CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER

According to the Specification's Background section, "programmable control devices located at a personal residence often require technical support. Implementations of 'trouble ticket' or customer support capabilities can be tailored for a particular vendor or environment." Spec. ¶ 2. "[P]rior art techniques[, however,] are typically limited to a single environment or potentially a small number of support environments because support engineers are confined by the capabilities of their support infrastructure."

Id. ¶ 4.

Appellant's invention relates to "a method and system for providing a centralized interface to an integrated work queue of tasks (e.g., action items) where each task could have originated on a different and potentially remote system." *Id.* ¶ 1. Notably, Appellant's invention relates to "a Hub (centralized system) and Spoke (remote system) integration of service tasks wherein each service task may further be automatically enabled for processing (*i.e.*, performance of the task) in the context and environment of the originating Spoke system." *Id.*

Claim 1 is representative and reproduced below:

1. A method of operating a central computer system to provide support for one or more infrastructure technology (IT) environments, the method comprising:
 - integrating, at a central computing system, a plurality of sub-tickets from a plurality of disparate remote systems, including:
 - receiving, at the central computing system, a first sub-ticket from a first remote system, the first sub-ticket comprising a portion, less than all, of attributes associated with a first trouble ticket at the first remote system,
 - receiving, at the central computing system, a second sub-ticket from a second remote system, wherein the second remote

system is different from the first remote system, the second sub-ticket comprising a portion, less than all, of attributes associated with a second trouble ticket at the second remote system,

integrating, by the central computer system, information from the first sub-ticket and the second sub-ticket to form a consolidated information set in a single queue;

providing the consolidated information set to a plurality of users of the central computer system for selection of at least one of the first and second sub-tickets by one of the plurality of users of the central computer;

receiving an indication of a selection of the first sub-ticket or the second sub-ticket by one of the plurality of users;

in response to receiving the indication of the selection of the first sub-ticket from one of the plurality of users on the central computing system, opening a window from the first remote system on a display of the central computing system and activating a session between the central computing system and the first remote system, wherein the window is in a context of the first remote system, and rendering all details of the first trouble ticket in the window to enable the user to perform work directly on the first remote system from the central computing system using the window and the activated session between the central computing system and the first remote system as requested in the first trouble ticket; and

in response to receiving the indication of the selection of the second sub-ticket from one of the plurality of users on the central computing system, opening a window from the second remote system on the display of the central computing system and activating a session between the central computing system and the second remote system, wherein the window is in a context of the second remote system, and rendering all details of the second trouble ticket in the window to enable the user to perform work directly on the second remote system from the central computing system using the window and the activated session between the central computing system and the second remote system as requested in the second trouble ticket.

REJECTIONS

Claims 1–7, 10, 11, 14–16, 20–24, and 26–31 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 5–7.

Claims 1–3, 6, 7, 10, 14–16, 20–24, 26, and 27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Habibi (US 2006/0178898 A1; Aug. 10, 2006) and Lutz (US 2008/0195614 A1; Aug. 14, 2008). Final Act. 7–27.

Claims 4 and 5 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Habibi, Lutz, and Lukasik (US 2008/0270910 A1; Oct. 30, 2008). Final Act. 27–28.

Claim 11 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Habibi, Lutz, and Suishu (US 7,356,640 B2; Apr. 8, 2008). Final Act. 29.

Claims 28–31 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Habibi, Lutz, and Ingman (US 2004/0111634 A1; June 10, 2004). Final Act. 29–33.

ANALYSIS

THE PATENT INELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER REJECTION

The Supreme Court’s two-step framework (the “*Alice/Mayo* test”) guides our analysis of patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. *See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l*, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014); *see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.*, 566 U.S. 66 (2012). In addition, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) recently published revised guidance for evaluating subject matter eligibility under

35 U.S.C. § 101, specifically with respect to applying the *Alice* /*Mayo* test. USPTO, *2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance*, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). If a claim falls within one of the statutory categories of patent eligibility (i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter), we determine whether the claim is directed to one of the judicially recognized exceptions (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea). *Alice*, 573 U.S. at 217. As part of our inquiry, we “look at the ‘focus of the claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the claim’s ‘character as a whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.” *Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC*, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The Guidance directs us to address this inquiry using the following two prongs of analysis: (i) does the claim recite a judicial exception (e.g., an abstract idea), and (ii) if so, is the judicial exception integrated into a practical application. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54.

Although the independent claims each broadly fall within the statutory categories of patentability, the Examiner concludes the claims are directed to “managing trouble tickets.” Final Act. 5. According to the Examiner, claim 1 is similar to a representative claim, which recited receiving, screening, and distributing messages, that the Federal Circuit found ineligible in *Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp.*, 838 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2016). *Id.* at 5–6.

Appellant asserts the claims are not directed to an abstract idea. *See* Appeal Br. 13–20; Reply Br. 2–4. Appellant argues, among other things, the Examiner failed to establish a prima facie case of patent ineligibility by describing the claims at a high level of abstraction as being directed to

managing trouble tickets. Appeal Br. 14–16 (citing *Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.*, 822 F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). We disagree.

The Examiner has a duty to give notice of a rejection with sufficient particularity to give Appellant a fair opportunity to respond to the rejection. *See* 35 U.S.C. § 132(a). That section “is violated when a rejection is so uninformative that it prevents the applicant from recognizing and seeking to counter the grounds for rejection.” *Chester v. Miller*, 906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Here, we find the Examiner’s rejection satisfies the initial burden of production by identifying that the claims include limitations similar to the identified abstract idea of “managing trouble tickets,” and that the remainder of the claims do not add significantly more to the abstract idea because the generically-recited computer elements are well-understood, routine, and conventional. Final Act. 5–7. Accordingly, the Examiner (1) set forth the statutory basis for the rejection, namely 35 U.S.C. § 101; (2) concluded that the claims are directed to a judicial exception to § 101, namely an abstract idea; and (3) explained the rejection in sufficient detail to permit Appellant to respond meaningfully. *See In re Jung*, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011). On this record, then, the Examiner established a *prima facie* case of ineligibility.

Here, although the claims recite and generally relate to managing trouble tickets, we conclude the claims are *directed to* managing trouble tickets by consolidating tickets from multiple remote systems and enabling support personnel to work in a remote system by opening a window from and in the context of the remote system and activating a session with the remote system. As described in the Specification, it was known that upon a

typical troubleshooting support employee issuing a “trouble ticket” to an end user, the employee was confined to a particular set of supported capabilities and environments. Spec. ¶ 2. And, although troubleshooting support has been increasingly “outsourced” to service providers across different countries, the complete replication of data by a service provider may not be a viable solution due to the substantially different rules about transmission and storage of data at various “outsourcing” locations. *Id.* ¶ 3.

Appellant’s invention provides a centralized interface to an integrated work queue of tasks where each task originates on a different remote system. *Id.* ¶¶ 1, 9. A problem ticket is generated in the remote (Spoke) system when a problem is detected on a computer device. *Id.* ¶¶ 24, 26. If the system determines not to service the problem at the remote system, a portion of the problem ticket information is sent to a Hub and integrated with other existing support tickets from the same and other remote systems for automatic or manual assignments to Hub-users. *Id.* ¶ 26. Once a Hub-user selects the highest priority ticket from her queue, the Hub system collects the problem ticket information (and possibly other information) to activate a session with the remote system or a computer on the Spoke system in that remote system’s context. *Id.* ¶ 27. Using a session in the remote system’s context, the Hub-user may then work on resolving the problem ticket associated with the remote system by using the remote system’s environment without the Hub system’s environment interfering with the Hub-user’s ability to work the ticket. *Id.* Thus, Appellant’s claimed systems and methods do not reflect simply managing trouble tickets. Accordingly, we conclude Appellant’s claims are not *directed to* merely the abstract idea

of any type of trouble ticket management; rather, the claims are directed to a specific application of managing trouble tickets that consolidates sub-tickets from multiple remote systems and enables support personnel to work in a remote system by opening a window from, and in the context of, the remote system and activating a session with the remote system.

Claim 1 is reproduced below, with the claim limitations that recite elements of the abstract idea of managing trouble tickets emphasized in *italics*:

1. A method of operating a central computer system to *provide support for one or more infrastructure technology (IT) environments*, the method comprising:
 - integrating*, at a central computing system, *a plurality of sub-tickets from a plurality of disparate remote systems*, including:
 - receiving*, at the central computing system, *a first sub-ticket from a first remote system, the first sub-ticket comprising a portion, less than all, of attributes associated with a first trouble ticket at the first remote system*,
 - receiving*, at the central computing system, *a second sub-ticket from a second remote system, wherein the second remote system is different from the first remote system, the second sub-ticket comprising a portion, less than all, of attributes associated with a second trouble ticket at the second remote system*,
 - integrating*, by the central computer system, *information from the first sub-ticket and the second sub-ticket to form a consolidated information set in a single queue*;
 - providing the consolidated information set to a plurality of users of the central computer system for selection of at least one of the first and second sub-tickets by one of the plurality of users of the central computer*;
 - receiving an indication of a selection of the first sub-ticket or the second sub-ticket by one of the plurality of users*;
 - in response to receiving the indication of the selection of the first sub-ticket from one of the plurality of users on the central

computing system, opening a window from the first remote system on a display of the central computing system and activating a session between the central computing system and the first remote system, wherein the window is in a context of the first remote system, and rendering all details of the first trouble ticket in the window to enable the user to perform work directly on the first remote system from the central computing system using the window and the activated session between the central computing system and the first remote system as requested in the first trouble ticket; and

in response to receiving the indication of the selection of the second sub-ticket from one of the plurality of users on the central computing system, opening a window from the second remote system on the display of the central computing system and activating a session between the central computing system and the second remote system, wherein the window is in a context of the second remote system, and rendering all details of the second trouble ticket in the window to enable the user to perform work directly on the second remote system from the central computing system using the window and the activated session between the central computing system and the second remote system as requested in the second trouble ticket.

More particularly, managing trouble tickets comprises (i) receiving a first and second sub-ticket, each comprising a portion of attributes associated with, respectively, a first and second trouble ticket (i.e., the claimed receiving sub-ticket steps); (ii) integrating the first and second sub-tickets to form a consolidated information set (i.e., the claimed integrating step);² (iii) providing the consolidated information set for selection of at least one of the first and second sub-tickets (i.e., the claimed providing step); and

² Collectively, the two receiving sub-ticket steps and the integrating step make up the sub-steps required by the recited “integrating . . . a plurality of sub-tickets” step, which must include these three steps and *may* include other steps not recited in claim 1.

(iv) receiving an indication of a selection of the first or second sub-ticket (i.e., the claimed receiving indication step).

The claimed receiving sub-ticket, integrating, providing, and receiving indication steps in claim 1 constitute mental processes because, but for the generic computing elements, the steps could be performed mentally. Our Guidance identifies mental processes as another category of abstract ideas. 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. If a claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer components, then it is still in the mental processes category unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the mind. *See id.*; *see also Intellectual Ventures*, 838 F.3d at 1318 (“[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”); *Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A.*, 830 F.3d 1350, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that “analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds” is a mental process within the abstract idea category and concluding claims directed to “collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis” were abstract); *Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp.*, 850 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (concluding claims that focused on collecting, displaying and manipulating data were directed to an abstract idea). Because the claim recites a judicial exception, our Guidance directs us to address whether any recited additional elements integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.

“Prong Two represents a change from prior guidance.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. Notably, “[t]his prong adds a more detailed eligibility analysis to step one of the *Alice/Mayo* test (USPTO Step 2A) than was required under prior guidance.” *Id.* According to this prong, because the claim recites a judicial exception, we next determine whether the claim *as a whole* integrates the judicial exception into a practical application. *Id.* To determine whether the claim *as a whole* integrates the judicial exception into a practical application, we identify whether there are “*any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s)*” and evaluate those elements to determine whether they integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (emphasis added); *see also* MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018).

Appellant argues the claimed invention enables a user to perform work directly on a remote system from a central computing system, which (1) improves computer technology (Appeal Br. 15); (2) overcomes technical problems encountered due to a central computing system and remote systems having different technologies or applications (*id.* at 19 (quoting Spec. ¶ 19)); (3) results in an improvement in computer-related function like the claims in *McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America, Inc.*, 837 F.3d 1299, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Appeal Br. 20); and (4) provides a technical solution to a technical problem like the claims in *DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.*, 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Appeal Br. 22).

Here, we find the additional limitations integrate the abstract concept of managing trouble tickets into a practical application. In particular, we

find the claim does not merely manage trouble tickets, but rather, in response to the received indication that a user selects a first sub-ticket, the claim recites “opening a window from the first remote system on a display of the central computing system and activating a session between the central computing system and the first remote system, wherein the window is in a context of the first remote system, and rendering all details of the first trouble ticket in the window to enable the user to perform work directly on the first remote system from the central computing system using the window and the activated session between the central computing system and the first remote system as requested in the first trouble ticket.” Appeal Br. 26 (Claims App’x).

As described in the Specification, the use of the claimed window from the first remote system on a display of the central computing system provides an improvement over the existing trouble ticket management systems and methods. For example, the Specification discloses:

[b]y using a session in the context of the Spoke system’s region[,] the Hub-user can more effectively address issues particular to the trouble ticket. In this manner, the environment of the Hub-user on Central Hub System 110 is not as apt to interfere with the Hub-user’s ability to work the ticket. For example, the Central Hub System 110 does not have to have any particular versions of software which may vary (and possibly conflict) from region to region.

Spec. ¶ 27; *see also* MPEP § 2106.05(a) (“An indication that the claimed invention provides an improvement can include a discussion in the specification that identifies a technical problem and explains the details of an

unconventional technical solution expressed in the claim, or identifies technical improvements realized by the claim over the prior art.”).

Thus, because claim 1 as a whole integrates the recited abstract idea into a practical application of that abstract idea, claim 1 is not *directed to* the abstract idea. *See* 84 Fed. Reg. at 53 (“A claim is not ‘directed to’ a judicial exception . . . if the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application of that exception.”).

“Because we find the claims are not directed to an abstract idea, we need not proceed to step two.” *Thales Visionix Inc. v. U.S.*, 850 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2017); *see* 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“Only when a claim recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate the exception into a practical application, is the claim ‘directed to’ a judicial exception, thereby triggering the need for further analysis pursuant to the second step of the *Alice/Mayo* test (USPTO Step 2B).”).

For the reasons discussed above, we conclude Appellant’s claims are patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. *See* 84 Fed. Reg. at 53 (“A claim . . . is patent eligible . . . if the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application of that exception.”). Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–7, 10, 11, 14–16, 20–24, and 26–31 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS

The Examiner finds Habibi discloses many recited elements of independent claim 1 including, among other things, integrating, at a central computing system, a first sub-ticket and a second sub-ticket from disparate remote systems to form a consolidated information set in a single queue.

Final Act. 7–9 (citing Habibi ¶¶ 44–45, 193; claim 10). The Examiner finds Habibi discloses “receiving an indication of a selection of the first sub-ticket or the second sub-ticket by” a user, and

in response to receiving the indication of the selection of the first sub-ticket from one of the plurality of users on the central computing system, opening a window from the first remote system on a display of the central computing system and activating a session between the central computing system and the first remote system, wherein the window is in a context of the first remote system, and rendering all details of the first trouble ticket in the window to enable the user to perform work directly on the first remote system from the central computing system using the window and the activated session between the central computing system and the first remote system as requested in the first trouble ticket; and

in response to receiving the indication of the selection of the second sub-ticket from one of the plurality of users on the central computing system, opening a window from the second remote system on the display of the central computing system and activating a session between the central computing system and the second remote system, wherein the window is in a context of the second remote system, and rendering all details of the second trouble ticket in the window to enable the user to perform work directly on the second remote system from the central computing system using the window and the activated session between the central computing system and the second remote system as requested in the second trouble ticket,

(the opening a window steps), as recited in claim 1. *Id.* at 9–10 (citing Habibi ¶¶ 92, 112–113, 166, 351, claim 10). Although the Examiner acknowledges that each of Habibi’s sub-tickets do not comprise a sub-portion (i.e., less than all) of the attributes associated with a trouble ticket at a remote system, the Examiner cites Lutz for teaching this feature in

concluding that the claim would have been obvious. *Id.* at 8 (citing Lutz ¶ 22).

In the Appeal Brief, Appellant reproduces limitations from claim 1 and the portions of Habibi cited by the Examiner, and asserts the cited sections of Habibi do not teach the recited language. *See* Appeal Br. 23–24. Allegations that the cited portions of the reference fail to disclose or teach the recited limitations without attempting to indicate how the recited claim language distinguishes over Habibi’s cited sections do not constitute substantive arguments in response to the Examiner’s findings for separate consideration by the Board. *See Ex parte Belinne*, Appeal 2009-004693, 2009 WL 2477843 (BPAI Aug. 10, 2009) (informative). Notably, the appellants in *Belinne* merely (1) restated elements from the claim, and (2) argued that they were missing from the cited reference, but failed to explain why the Examiner’s fact finding was erroneous. *Id.* at *4; *accord In re Lovin*, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[T]he Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.”); 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv); Ans. 6 (citing *Lovin*, 652 F.3d 1349; 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv)).

Appellant, however, presents more substantive arguments in the Reply Brief. Reply Br. 7–9. Notably, Appellant argues Habibi’s browser interface and pop-up window described in the cited portions of Habibi teaches rendering all details of a trouble ticket in a window to enable a user to perform work directly on a remote system from a central computing system

using the window and an activated session. *Id.* at 9. Appellant explains that Habibi fails to mention the capability of rendering all ticket details in a window to enable a Hub-user to perform work directly on the remote system using the claimed window an activated session. *Id.*

Normally, any argument raised in the Reply Brief not raised in the Appeal Brief is untimely and not considered by the Board. *See* 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2). But under the same rule, arguments responsive to an argument raised in the Examiner’s Answer are not untimely. *See id.* That is the case here. Appellant’s substantive arguments in the Reply Brief mentioned above are responsive to the Examiner’s findings in the Answer—i.e., that paragraphs 92, 112, 113, 166, and 351 of Habibi “disclose a universal browser interface to manage data with Windows ® implementations *in all embodiments.*” Ans. 6.

We agree with Appellant that the Examiner’s reliance on Habibi to teach or suggest the opening a window steps is problematic. At the outset, we note the Examiner relies solely on Habibi’s claim 10 in the Final Action to teach or suggest receiving an indication of a selection of a first sub-ticket or a second sub-ticket by one of a plurality of users, as recited in claim 1. *See* Final Act. 9. Habibi’s claim 10 discloses “send[ing] each collected help request to an appropriate one of the trouble ticketing systems for resolution and correlate any response received with the sent help request.”

Even if Habibi suggests that the received response from an appropriate one of the trouble ticketing systems is an indication of a selection of a sub-ticket from one of a plurality of users on a central computing system, we fail to see how Habibi teaches or suggests the

window opening steps. Notably, the Examiner explains that all embodiments of Habibi teach a universal browser interface to manage data. Ans. 6. But, even accepting that finding, we fail to see—nor has the Examiner shown—how Habibi teaches or suggests the entirety of the limitation. Specifically, claim 1 recites: in response to the received response, (1) opening a window from a first remote system on a display of a central computing system, (2) activating a session between the central computing system and the first remote system, wherein the window is in a context of the first remote system, and (3) rendering all details of a first trouble ticket in a window to enable a user to perform work directly on the first remote system from the central computing system using the window and the activated session between the central computing system and the first remote system as requested in the first trouble ticket. *Accord* Reply Br. 9.

Accordingly, we are persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting (1) independent claim 1, (2) independent claims 22, 26, and 27, which recite commensurate limitations, and (3) dependent claims 2–7, 10, 11, 14–16, 20, 21, 23, 24, and 28–31 for similar reasons. *See In re Fine*, 837 F.2d 1071, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting “[d]ependent claims are nonobvious under section 103 if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious.”).

CONCLUSION

In summary:

Claims Rejected	Basis	Affirmed	Reversed
1-7, 10, 11, 14-16, 20-24, 26-31	§ 101		1-7, 10, 11, 14-16, 20-24, and 26-31
1-3, 6, 7, 10, 14-16, 20-24, 26, 27	§ 103 Habibi, Lutz		1-3, 6, 7, 10, 14-16, 20-24, 26, 27
4, 5	§ 103 Habibi, Lutz, Lukasik		4, 5
11	§ 103 Habibi, Lutz, Suishu		11
28-31	§ 103 Habibi, Lutz, Ingman		28-31
Overall Outcome			1-7, 10, 11, 14-16, 20-24, and 26-31

REVERSED