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UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

Ex parte YIGAL DAN RUBINSTEIN, ABHISHEK DOSHI, and
RESHMA KHILNANI EBBERSON

Appeal 2018-006026
Application 13/836,828¹
Technology Center 3600

Before MICHAEL W. KIM, HUNG H. BUI, and ADAM J. PYONIN,
Administrative Patent Judges.

BUI, *Administrative Patent Judge.*

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1–20, which are all the claims pending in the application. App. Br. 24–33 (Claims App.). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

We AFFIRM.²

¹ We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. The real party in interest is Facebook, Inc. App. Br. 2.

² Our Decision refers to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“App. Br.”) filed December 12, 2017; Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”) filed April 23, 2018; Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”) mailed March 9, 2018; Final Office Action (“Final Act.”) mailed May 16, 2017; and original Specification (“Spec.”) filed March 15, 2013.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant's Invention

Appellant's invention relates to "advertising via a social networking system" and enabling users "to promote certain actions, posts, or other content [as a story (e.g., a video of a movie trailer)] that is represented in a social networking system" as well as "to more easily generate requests for sponsored stories using interface controls that enable promotion of specific actions, posts, or other content viewable in an interface of the social networking system." Spec. ¶¶ 1, 5, 30. According to Appellant, the social networking system (1) "determines [] how effective a promotion is in increasing access to a story," and (2) "determines scores for various stories and selects stories for presentation based on the scores." Spec. ¶ 8. "Parameters specifying how selected content is distributed to other social networking system users" may include "a budget and/or a bid amount to identify compensation provided to the social networking system for presenting the selected content to its users, allowing the promoting user to increase the likelihood that other users receive, or access, the selected content." Spec. ¶ 19. "Examples of content [] include a page post, a status update, a photograph, a video, a link, a shared content item, a gaming application achievement, a check-in event at a local business, a brand page, or any other type of content." Spec. ¶ 39.

Representative Claim

Claims 1, 9, and 17 are independent. Representative claim 1 is reproduced below:

1. A method comprising:
providing a user interface for displaying a plurality of stories to a promoting user;

receiving a sponsored story request from a promoting user, the sponsored story request identifying a story from the plurality of stories displayed to the promoting user, the identified story associated with an action stored by the social networking system and providing one or more parameters including a bid amount;

generating a copy of the story identified by the sponsored story request;

receiving a plurality of requests from a plurality of viewing users for presentation of one or more stories, each describing an action stored by the social networking system;

for each request of the plurality of requests for presentation of one or more stories:

retrieving a plurality of candidate stories including the story identified by the sponsored story request;

determining a score for each of the candidate stories, a score for the story identified by the sponsored story request based at least in part on the bid amount of the sponsored story request;

determining a score for the copy of the story identified by the sponsored story request, the score for the copy of the story identified by the sponsored story not being based on the bid amount of the sponsored story request;

selecting one or more stories for presentation to a viewing user that sent the request based at least in part on the determined scores for each of the candidate stories;

responsive to the story identified by the sponsored story request being selected for presentation to the viewing user:

sending a feed of stories for display to the viewing user, the feed of stories including the story identified by the sponsored story request, and

determining whether the copy of the story identified by the sponsored story request would be selected for presentation to the viewing user based on (a) the score of

the copy of the story identified by the sponsored story request that is not based on the bid amount of the sponsored story request, and (b) the scores of one or more of the selected one or more stories;

determining a statistic based at least in part on a number of times the story identified by the sponsored story request is included in the selected one or more stories and a number of times the copy of the story identified by the sponsored story request would be included in the selected one or more stories; and

storing the determined statistic.

App. Br. 24–25 (Claims App.).

EXAMINER’S REJECTION³

Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2–3.

ANALYSIS

In support of the § 101 rejection of claims 1–20, the Examiner determines Appellant’s claims are directed to “providing content or advertisement based on sponsored stories and scores,” which the Examiner finds is “a fundamental economic practice” or a series of mental processes,

³ Claims 1–16 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over Schoen et al. (US 2012/0203831 A1; published Aug. 9, 2012), Anderson et al. (US 2012/0153285 A1; published June 17, 2010), Fougner et al. (US 2012/0233009 A1; published Sept. 13, 2012), Covell et al. (US 9,053,129 B1; issued June 9, 2015), and Jackson et al. (US 8,606,792 B1; issued Dec. 10, 2013) (Final Act. 4–17). Similarly, claims 17–20 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over Schoen and Robison et al. (US 2012/0110032 A1; published May 3, 2012) (Final Act. 17–19). However, the Examiner has withdrawn these rejections (Ans. 3). As such, these rejections are no longer on appeal.

and include limitations that are similar or analogous to the claims found by the Federal Circuit to be an patent in-eligible in *Electric Power Group, LLC, v. Alstom*, 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that the concept of “collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis” is a mental process). Ans. 4–5; *see also* Final Act. 2.

The Examiner also determines the additional elements (i.e., “user interface” and “social networking system” recited in claims 1, 9, and 17), when analyzed individually and as an ordered combination, do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea because these additional elements are: (1) “general purpose computer [elements]”; (2) recited “at the highest level of generality”; and (3) “perform[] basic computer functions that are well-understood, routine, and conventional.” Ans. 4.

Legal Framework

To determine whether claims are patent eligible under § 101, we apply the Supreme Court’s two-step framework articulated in *Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l*, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). First, we determine whether the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept: laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. *Id.* at 216. If so, we then proceed to the second step to consider the elements of the claims “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” *Id.* at 217. In other words, the second step is to “search for an ‘inventive concept’—*i.e.*, an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent

upon the [ineligible concept] itself.” *Id.* at 218 (alteration in original, internal quotation marks omitted).

The Federal Circuit has described the *Alice* step-one inquiry as looking at the “focus” of the claims, their “character as a whole,” and the *Alice* step-two inquiry as looking more precisely at what the claim elements add—whether they identify an “inventive concept” in the application of the ineligible matter to which the claim is directed. *See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.*, 822 F.3d 1327, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2016); *Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc.*, 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

In an effort to achieve clarity and consistency in how the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the “Office”) applies the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, the Office has published revised guidance interpreting governing case law and establishing a prosecution framework for all patent-eligibility analysis under *Alice* and § 101 effective as of January 7, 2019. *2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance*, 84 Fed. Reg. 50–57 (Jan. 7, 2019); *see also* USPTO October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, 84 Fed. Reg. 55942–53 (Oct. 17, 2019) (updating the guidance promulgated in January 2019 with “examples as well as a discussion of various issues raised by the public comments”) (collectively, the “2019 Revised Guidance”).

2019 Revised Guidance

Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, we first look under *Alice* step 1 or “Step 2A” to whether the claim recites:

- (1) Prong One: any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., [i] mathematical concepts, [ii] mental processes—concepts performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment,

opinion), or [iii] certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice or managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people); and

(2) Prong Two: additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (*see* Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).⁴

See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51–52, 55, Revised Step 2A, Prong One (Abstract Idea) and Prong Two (Integration into A Practical Application). Only if a claim: (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then evaluate whether the claim provides an “inventive concept” under *Alice* step 2 or “Step 2B.” *See* 2019 Revised Guidance at 56; *Alice*, 573 U.S. at 217–18.

For example, we look to whether the claim:

- 1) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (*see* MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
- 2) simply appends well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.

See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.

Alice/Mayo—Step 1 (Abstract Idea)

Step 2A—Prongs 1 and 2 identified in the Revised Guidance

Step 2A—Prong 1

Appellant argues (1) the Examiner “has over simplified that the claims to the point where the identified abstract idea fails to account for specific

⁴ All references to the MPEP are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 08.2017 (rev. Jan. 2018).

requirements of the claims,” and (2) claims 1–20 are not directed to an abstract idea because (i) claims 1–16 are directed to determining statistics that describe how effective a promotion is in increasing access to a story, in particular to determine whether a promoted story would have been selected for presentation to a user without being promoted to determine if the promotion contributes the presentation of the promoted story,” and (ii) “[c]laims 17–20 are directed to providing a user interface to a user for promoting stories posted to a social networking system by the user or by an additional user connected to the user.” App. Br. 8–9 (citing Spec. ¶ 8).

Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. At the outset, we note Appellant’s Specification and claims describe “advertising via a social networking system” and enabling users “to promote certain actions, posts, or other content [i.e., story] that is represented in a social networking system” as well as “to more easily generate requests for sponsored stories using interface controls that enable promotion of specific actions, posts, or other content viewable in an interface of the social networking system.” Spec. ¶¶ 1, 5. According to Appellant, the social networking system (1) “determines [] how effective a promotion is in increasing access to a story,” and (2) “determines scores for various stories and selects stories for presentation based on the scores.” Spec. ¶ 8.

Consistent with Appellant’s Specification, as recognized by the Examiner, limitations of claim 1’s recited method, under their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite (1) “displaying a plurality of stories to a promoting user”; (2) “receiving a sponsored story request from a promoting user”; (3) “generating a copy of the story identified by the sponsored story request”; (4) “receiving a plurality of request[s] [] for presentation of one or

more stories”; (5) “for each request” (5a) “retrieving a plurality of candidate stories,” (5b) “determining a score for each of the candidate stories,” (5c) “determining a score for the copy of the story,” (5d) “selecting one or more stories,” (5e) “sending a feed of stories,” (5f) “determining whether the copy of the story identified would be selected,” (6) “determining a statistic,” and (7) “storing the determined statistic,” which are known business activities, especially in the context of advertisement and content promotion to determine the effectiveness of promoting a story—a fundamental economic practice in our system of commerce, one of “certain methods of organizing human activity” identified in the Revised Guidance, and therefore an abstract idea. *See Revised Guidance (Revised Step 2A, Prong One)*, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (describing an abstract idea category of “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity—fundamental economic principles or practices . . . commercial or legal interactions (including . . . advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations)”), 54. Ans. 7; *see Spec.* ¶¶ 2–10, 25–26.

Such economic activities are squarely within the realm of abstract ideas, including those identified by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit as abstract ideas, such as, for example: (1) the risk hedging in *Bilski v. Kappos*, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); (2) the intermediated settlement in *Alice*, 573 U.S. at 220 (2014); (3) verifying credit card transactions in *CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc.*, 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011); (4) managing a stable value protected life insurance policy in *Bancorp. Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur., Co. of Canada (US)*, 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012); (5) guaranteeing transactions in *buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc.*, 765 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014); (6) distributing products over the Internet

in *Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC*, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014); (7) determining a price of a product offered to a purchasing organization in *Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP America, Inc.*, 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015); (8) pricing a product for sale in *OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015); (9) delivering user-selected media content (i.e., targeted advertisement) to a portable device in *Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Amazon.com*, 838 F.3d 1266, 1269, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2016); and taking orders from restaurant customers in *Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc.*, 842 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Target advertisement and content promotion to end users based on sponsored stories and scores, via a social network, is also a building block of commerce, insurance and, like risk hedging and intermediated settlement, is one of certain methods of organizing human activity, which are abstract ideas beyond the scope of § 101. *See Alice*, 573 U.S. at 220.

As further recognized by the Examiner, the limitations of Appellant’s claim 1, under their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite nothing more than a series of steps collecting (receiving), analyzing (identifying, determining, selecting), and storing statistic information to determine the effectiveness of promoting a story, which are a series of “mental processes” that could also be performed in part in the human mind and in part by a marketing person using a pen and paper (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion), and therefore an abstract idea. Ans. 6–7; *see CyberSource*, 654 F.3d at 1372–73 (“[A] method that can be performed by human thought alone is merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under § 101.”); *see also In re Comiskey*, 554 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[M]ental processes—or processes of human thinking—standing alone are

not patentable even if they have practical application.”); *Gottschalk v. Benson*, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (“Phenomena of nature, . . . *mental processes*, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.” (Emphasis added)). Additionally, mental processes remain unpatentable even when automated to reduce the burden on the user of what once could have been done with pen and paper. *CyberSource*, 654 F.3d at 1375 (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, were precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in *Gottschalk v. Benson*.”).

For example, limitations (1)–(4) in claim 1 describe steps performed by a marketing person of an advertising company who is tasked to receive a request from a sponsor to promote a particular story (e.g., a video of a movie trailer), make a copy of a promoted story (also referred to as a “ghost story”), and receive one or more requests from viewers to review the story. Limitation (5) in claim 1 describes for each request from a viewer, the marketing person is required to determine a score for each candidate story and the copy of the story sponsored, send a feed of stories for display, and determine whether the copy of the promoted story should be selected for presentation. Limitations (6)–(7) in claim 1 describe steps performed by the same marketing person who is tasked to determine and save statistics of the promoted story and the copy of the promoted story using a pen and paper.

Thus, under Step 2A, Prong One, we agree with the Examiner that limitations (1)–(7) in Appellant’s claim 1 recite a fundamental economic practice and/or a series of mental processes as identified in the Revised Guidance, and thus, an abstract idea. *See* 2019 Revised Guidance (*Revised Step 2A, Prong One*), 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, 54.

Step 2A—Prong 2 (Integration into Practical Application)

Under *Step 2A, Prong Two* of the Revised Guidance, we next determine if the claims recite additional elements (i.e., additional limitations beyond the judicial exception) that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Here, for the reasons stated below, we discern no additional element (or combination of elements) recited in Appellant’s claims 1, 9, and 17 that integrate(s) the judicial exception into a practical application. *See Revised Guidance*, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (“Prong Two”).

For example, Appellant’s additional elements (i.e., “user interface” and “social networking system” recited in method claims 1, 9, and 17) do not (1) improve the functioning of a computer or other technology, (2) are not applied with any particular machine (except for generic computer components), (3) do not effect a transformation of a particular article to a different state, and (4) are not applied in any meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. *See MPEP* §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).

Appellant argues that, similar to the claims in *DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.*, 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014), (1) “the claims are ‘rooted in computer technology,’” (2) “the claims overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer network as the claims deal with determining the efficiencies of online distribution of content [which is different from physical distribution of content],” and (3) “the claims do

improve the functioning of the computer,” i.e., “improving the selection of the stories to be provided to use.” App. Br. 9–10; Reply Br. 3–5.

Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. In *DDR Holdings*, the claims were directed to an e-commerce syndication system for “generating a composite web page that combines selected visual elements of a host website with content of a third-party merchant.” See *DDR Holding’s* U.S. Patent No. 7,818,399 (*DDR’s* ’399 patent). The Federal Circuit found *DDR’s* claims are patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because *DDR’s* claims: (1) do not merely recite “the performance of some business practice known from the pre-Internet world” previously disclosed in *Bilski* and *Alice*; but instead (2) provide a technical solution to a technical problem unique to the Internet, i.e., a “solution . . . necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.” *DDR*, 773 F.3d at 1257.

In contrast, Appellant’s invention, involving collecting (receiving), analyzing (identifying, determining, selecting), and storing statistic information to determine the effectiveness of promoting a story, is neither “rooted in computer technology” nor provided any “technical solution to a technical problem” as contemplated by the Federal Circuit in *DDR*. See MPEP § 2106.05(a). For example, Appellant’s claimed collecting (receiving), analyzing (identifying, determining, selecting), and storing statistic information does not provide a technical solution to a technical problem unique to the Internet, i.e., a “solution . . . necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.” *DDR*, 773 F.3d at 1257.

As correctly recognized by the Examiner, Appellant’s invention “aims to solve an entrepreneurial problem rather than a technological one.” Ans. 5. More importantly, the focus of Appellant’s invention is not to improve the performance of computers or any computer-related technologies; but rather, to use a generic user interface and a social networking system as a tool for (1) “displaying a plurality of stories to a promoting user”; (2) “receiving a sponsored story request from a promoting user”; (3) “generating a copy of the story identified by the sponsored story request”; (4) “receiving a plurality of request[s] [] for presentation of one or more stories”; (5) “for each request” (5a) “retrieving a plurality of candidate stories,” (5b) “determining a score for each of the candidate stories,” (5c) “determining a score for the copy of the story,” (5d) “selecting one or more stories,” (5e) “sending a feed of stories,” (5f) “determining whether the copy of the story identified would be selected,” (6) “determining a statistic,” and (7) “storing the determined statistic” to determine the effectiveness of the promotion. *See* Spec. ¶¶ 1, 5, 8, 9, 19, 30, 39; Abstract. However, utilizing generic user interface and social networking system to promote content (story) based on sponsored stories and scores is insufficient to show “integration into a practical application.” *See* MPEP § 2106.05(f). Instead, these generic computing components are simply analogous to the “automation of the fundamental economic concept,” *OIP Techs.*, 788 F.3d at 1362–63. “[M]erely requiring generic computer implementation,” “does not move into [§] 101 eligibility territory.” *buySAFE*, 765 F.3d at 1354.

A claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea. *See Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.*, 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “No matter how much of an advance in the finance field the claims recite, the

advance lies entirely in the realm of abstract ideas, with no plausibly alleged innovation in the non-abstract application realm.” *See SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC*, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

For these reasons, we determine that (1) Appellant’s “additional elements” recited in claims 1, 17, and 32 do not integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical application and, as such, (2) Appellant’s claims are directed to an abstract idea. *See* 2019 Revised Guidance (*Revised Step 2A, Prong Two*), 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55.

*Alice/Mayo—Step 2 (Inventive Concept)
Step 2B identified in the Revised Guidance*

Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, only if a claim: (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then (3) look to whether the claim adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (*see* MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or, instead, it simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. *See* 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. However, we find no element or combination of elements recited in Appellant’s claims 1, 9, and 17 that contain any “inventive concept” or add anything “significantly more” to transform the abstract concept into a patent-eligible application. *Alice*, 573 U.S. 208 at 221.

Appellant does not identify any specific limitation of claims 1, 9, and 17 beyond the recited judicial exception that is not “‘well-understood, routine, conventional’ in the field” as per MPEP § 2106.05(d). Instead, Appellant argues all the steps recited in claim 1, including, for example: “generating a copy of the story,” “determining a score for the copy of the

story identified by the sponsored story request,” “determining whether the copy of the story identified by the sponsored story request would be selected for presentation to the viewing user based on (a) the score of the copy of the story identified by the sponsored story request that is not based on the bid amount of the sponsored story request, and (b) the score of one or more of the selected one or more stories” simply “amount to significantly more than the identified abstract idea of ‘providing content or advertisement based on sponsored stories.’” App. Br. 12–13. In other words, Appellant refers to limitations recited in claims 1, 9, and 17 that are part of the judicial exception identified under *Alice* step 1, and then argues the same limitations “amount to significantly more than the identified abstract idea of ‘providing content or advertisement based on sponsored stories’” under *Alice* step 2.

Id.

We do not agree. Claim element(s) to be considered under *Alice* step 2 cannot be part of the abstract idea itself. *Berkheimer v. HP Inc.*, 881 F.3d 1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring) (“*Berkheimer* . . . leave[s] untouched the numerous cases from [the Federal Circuit] which have held claims ineligible because the only alleged ‘inventive concept’ is the abstract idea.”); *BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc.*, 899 F.3d 1281, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (indicating same). “Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” *Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.*, 133 S.Ct. 2107, 2117 (2013).

Because Appellant’s independent claims 1, 9, and 17 are directed to a patent-ineligible abstract concept and do not recite an “inventive concept” or provide a solution to a technical problem under the second step of the *Alice*

analysis, we sustain the Examiner's § 101 rejection of independent claims 1, 9, and 17, and their dependent claims 2–8, 10–16, and 18–20 not separately argued.

CONCLUSION

On the record before us, we conclude Appellant has not demonstrated the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. As such, we AFFIRM the Examiner's § 101 rejection of claims 1–20.

DECISION SUMMARY

Claims Rejected	35 U.S.C. §	Basis	Affirmed	Reversed
1–20	101	Non-Statutory	1–20	
Overall Outcome			1–20	

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED